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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation assesses the impact of coordinated asset transfers and asset ownership on 
poverty and food security, women’s empowerment, and child education in Zambia and Tanzania. In 
contrast to the traditional view of assets uniformly improving child development outcomes through 
wealth effects, Chapter 2 assesses whether different types of assets have differential effects on child 
education. I find that household durables and housing-quality characteristics have the expected 
positive effects, but agricultural assets have adverse effects on highest grade completed and test 
scores. I extend the agricultural-household model by explicitly including child labor to portray a 
theoretical framework for different assets to have differential effects and use three waves of 
National Panel Survey data from Tanzania to estimate empirical relationships. I correct for the 
endogeneity of assets and control for time-invariant unobservable by using the Hausman-Taylor 
instrumental variable (HTIV) method. Further examination reveals that the negative effect of 
agricultural assets is more pronounced among boys, rural children, poor children, and children from 
farming households. These conditions may raise the opportunity cost of schooling and result in 
weaker education outcomes. 
Building on the finding that different assets have differential effects, the third and fourth 
chapters assess the impact of an intervention that provides livestock, support services, and 
associated training to impoverished households in Zambia. In Chapter 3, I confirm previous 
findings that physical asset transfers increase income and consumption expenditures. Then I 
examine the practical significance of the increase in expenditures to assess whether it is large enough 
to trigger changes in consumption patterns or in subjective assessment of wellbeing status. Changes 
in composition of expenditures, composition of diet, and subjective self-assessment of poverty all 
suggest that the intervention contributes to a growing sense of economic security and a practically 
significant change in wellbeing. As transfers included three different types of animals – dairy cows, 
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meat goats, and draft cattle – I am able to discern that the impact does differ by the types of assets 
transferred. Examination of changes in the composition of consumption shows substantial effects 
on poverty and food security starting within six months of asset transfers. Persistence of the impact 
through the next 18 months of the study period indicates that livestock transfers can have a 
sustained effect on poverty and food security. 
In Chapter 4, I assess the impact of the same livestock transfer and training intervention on 
intra-household ‘decision-making’ over different farm household activities and resources. Using a 
two-period panel dataset, I use decision-making abilities as empowerment measures and find that the 
intervention significantly improved both women’s and men’s empowerment by expanding the scope 
of joint decision-making in household activities. In particular, the intervention helped increase the 
proportion of joint decisions by 17% in all household activities considered and both men’s and 
women’s independent decisions decreased by as much as 9%. Similar pattern follows when 
household activities were categorized to ‘treatment related’ and ‘other’ activities; women’s and men’s 
joint decisions increased at the expense of their independent decision-making participation. I 
confirm that the finding is consistent with the prediction of the Nash bargaining model because 
transferring economic resources to women or men leads to Pareto optimality in intra-household 
resource allocation only through co-operation between men and women.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this dissertation, I present three studies that collectively provide empirical evidence of 
asset-specific effects on measures of household wellbeing, women’s empowerment, and child 
education. I am specifically interested in these outcomes because, following the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG), most developmental interventions in the last 15 years have integrated 
‘hunger and poverty eradication’, ‘gender equality’, and ‘universal primary education’ in their 
programs. Policy interventions transferring economic resources have become increasingly popular 
and often transfer physical assets to impoverished families primarily through women and also 
provide awareness training (Banerjee et al. 2015; Kafle, Winter-Nelson and Goldsmith 2016; 
Jodlowski et al. 2016; Das et al. 2013). Other programs that do not directly transfer physical assets, 
such as conditional cash transfers (de Brauw et al. 2014; Gertler 2004; Bourguignon, Ferreira and 
Leite 2003; Skoufias et al. 2001; Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Akresh, De Walque and Kazianga 2013), 
micro-credit (Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright 2006; Garikipati 2012), and other in-kind physical asset 
transfers (Denning et al. 2009; Muralidharan and Prakash 2013), do contribute to asset 
accumulations in many ways. Collectively, these papers seek to provide insights about the 
particularities associated with transfers of specific economic resources to agrarian communities 
characterized by poverty and incomplete markets. Such transfers not only raise a recipient 
household’s wealth, but also alter the asset composition of the household and community. Given 
incomplete markets, these changes in asset mix could yield distinct impacts that warrant exploration.  
The existing body of literature suggests that assets reflect long run wealth status and can 
contribute to livelihood improvement through positive wealth effects (Filmer and Pritchett 2001a; 
Kim and Sherraden 2011a; Zhan and Sherraden 2003; Sahn and Stifel 2000; Sahn and Stifel 2003; 
McKenzie 2005). However, in contrast to the traditional view of assets uniformly contributing to 
wellbeing status through wealth effects, different types of assets can have differential effects on both 
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individual and household welfare. For example, transferring labor-using assets (such as livestock) 
may contribute to household food security and economic wellbeing, but may increase child labor to 
the detriment of child education. In contrast, labor-neutral assets like household durables and labor-
saving assets (such as access to electricity, water etc.) may contribute to household food security, 
poverty reduction, and child education. I provide three empirical studies first to examine 
differentiated effects of assets and then use a real world asset transfer program to assess the claim of 
asset-specific effects and investigate the role of transferred assets. If the claim that different types of 
assets have differential effects is robust, it may open a door for a new discussion in the development 
literature and potentially help reshape the current approach of transferring physical assets.  
In Chapter 2, I investigate whether different types of assets have differential effects on 
educational outcomes of children ages 6-18 in Tanzania. I explicitly include child labor in the 
standard agricultural-household model (Singh, Squire and Strauss 1986) to portray a mechanism for 
different assets to have differential effects on child education. Using the Hasuman-Taylor 
instrumental variable (HTIV) method (Hausman and Taylor 1981), I show that in contrast to the 
undifferentiated view of assets uniformly contributing to child education through positive wealth 
effects, agricultural assets have negative effects but household durables and housing quality assets 
have expected positive effects on child education. I argue that, in absence of a well-functioning labor 
market, any increase in labor-intensive assets increases child labor demand and at the same time may 
increase the opportunity cost of schooling to incentivize parents to move their children from school 
to household activities. In contrast, increase in labor-neutral or labor-saving assets contribute to 
individual and household wellbeing through positive wealth effects. This implies that, in general, the 
net effect of increases in household asset holdings is ambiguous and depends on types of assets, 
initial wealth status, and local labor market conditions.  
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Drawing on the general findings that the effect of assets on specific outcomes is dictated by 
the types of assets, the next two chapters assess the impact of an intervention transferring specific 
physical assets and support services in Zambia. These two chapters use longitudinal household 
survey data from a livestock transfer and training program in Zambia’s Copperbelt Province. The 
intervention is implemented by the NGO Heifer International and I take advantage of the program 
rollout to effectively design a controlled experiment. The intervention transfers 3 specific livestock 
species and support services to eligible households primarily through women. It also provides a 
comprehensive training on various societal themes to women and men from eligible households. 
Households receiving both livestock transfers and training form a ‘treated’ group and other eligible 
households that are scheduled to receive animals and training in the future form a ‘control’ group 
for the study.  
In Chapter 3, using data from baseline and 3 follow up surveys, I first confirm the previous 
findings that asset transfers help increase consumption expenditures (Jodlowski et al. 2016; Banerjee 
et al. 2015; Rawlins et al. 2014) and then assess the practical significance of the small absolute 
increase in consumption. The growth in consumption expenditure, though small, was transformative 
and had persistent effects on dietary quality, food security, and also helped trigger enhanced feeling 
of economic security and subjective wellbeing among program participants. Although all transferred 
assets had positive impact, the magnitude of the impact varied by the types of assets transferred 
suggesting asset-specific effects. Further examination reveals that non-recipients and non-
participants also benefitted from the program as the intervention helped transform the local food 
economy through increased availability of nutritious food items and reduced local food prices. 
In Chapter 4, I use a two-period panel dataset that comes from the field experiment in the 
Copperbelt Province. This chapter first confirms the previous findings and theoretical evidence that 
women’s empowerment corresponds to food security and economic wellbeing (Sharaunga, Mudhara 
4 
 
and Bogale 2015; Wilcox et al. 2015; Duflo 2012). Then I investigate whether the asset transfers and 
training alter the existing gender relations and intra-household decision-making, with a particular 
focus on women’s empowerment. Unlike the existing body of literature in gender studies and 
women’s empowerment, I examine both women’s and men’s decision-making participation and find 
that the intervention helped improve both women’s and men’s positions by expanding joint 
decisions in most household activities accompanied by a reduction in solitary decisions. This implies 
that transferring physical assets through women may place them in better position within the 
household and, as the Nash bargaining model predicts, this leads to increased co-operation and 
shared responsibilities between men and women.  
 Taken together these papers suggest both potential and problems with specific asset 
transfers to private households. Cash transfers may dominate in-kind transfers when markets are 
complete, but in agrarian settings in-kind transfers can alter the local economy and have positive 
spillover effects that would not emerge from cash transfer. Moreover, I see evidence that in-kind 
transfers can stimulate changes in household decision-making that could improve resource allocation 
and other development outcomes. On the other hand, altering the asset mix in a household can 
influence the opportunity cost of education and negatively affect human capital development. 
Overall, this suggests a need to understand local contexts in order to discern the appropriateness of 
a specific asset transfer.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DO DIFFERENT TYPES OF ASSETS HAVE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS ON CHILD 
EDUCATION? EVIDENCE FROM TANZANIA1 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Policy interventions that aim to reduce poverty and improve livelihood often transfer 
economic resources to people in need. Livestock transfers, such as BRAC’s (the largest non-
governmental development agency in the world) Ultra-poor Program (Das and Shams 2011) and 
Heifer International’s programs in many countries (Jodlowski et al. 2016; Kafle et al. 2016), 
represent one type of asset transfer program, but programs transferring agricultural inputs (Denning 
et al. 2009) and other in-kind physical assets have also been increasingly popular (Banerjee et al. 
2015; Muralidharan and Prakash 2013). Other forms of interventions, such as cash transfer, 
microcredit, or training, which do not transfer assets directly also contribute to asset accumulation 
by increasing household income. Although there is a strong current in the development literature 
advocating for cash transfers as superior to other asset transfers (Blattman and Niehaus 2014), it is 
believed that both asset and  cash transfers contribute to asset accumulation.  
While poverty is typically measured in terms of whether someone has sufficient daily income 
or consumption to meet basic needs, wealth creation through asset ownership is viewed by many 
development organizations as the long-run pathway out of poverty. A core element of a poverty-
reduction program in Bangladesh, run by BRAC and replicated in over 20 countries, for example, is 
an asset transfer program targeted to poor households. Banerjee et al. (2015) presents evidence from 
randomized control trials from several countries, with an asset transfer similar to the BRAC program 
as the core element, and shows that the effects on poverty reduction are significant and long-lasting. 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Dean Jolliffe, Alex Winter-Nelson, Kathy Baylis, Hope Michelson, Ben Crost, and 
Craig Gundersen for valuable comments and feedback. The paper has benefitted greatly from comments 
received from participants of i) the 2015 Agricultural and Applied Economics Association (AAEA) annual 
meeting, San Francisco, USA ii) the 2016 Association of African Agricultural Economists (AAAE) 
conference, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and iii) the 2017 Center for Studies of African Economies (CSAE) 
Conference in Oxford, UK, and iv) International Policy and Development seminar at University of Illinois. 
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Their findings indicate that the positive effects continue to exist three years after receipt of the asset 
transfer, and the positive effects are seen in all six countries in which the experiment was carried out 
(Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, India, Pakistan, and Peru). 
Increased asset ownership increases household wealth and greater wealth can improve 
wellbeing in many different ways. One path is through increased investments in human capital 
which can serve to break cycles of poverty and help to extract people from chronic poverty. As a 
key example of this pathway, a large body of evidence has established that increased holdings of 
physical assets result in greater investments in children’s education, particularly in the rich country 
context (Deng et al. 2014; Chowa et al. 2013; Huang 2013; Huang 2011; Elliott, Destin and Friedline 
2011; Kim and Sherraden 2011b; Shanks 2007; Zhan and Sherraden 2003; Conley 2001a; Loke 2013; 
Elliott and Sherraden 2013). There is also a fairly extensive body of research on the ‘asset-child 
education’ relationship in developing countries. Deng et al. (2014) and Filmer and Pritchett (2001) 
construct a measure of wealth based on assets and examine child education outcomes, others 
including Chowa et al. (2013) and Cockburn and Dostie (2007), construct measures of asset 
ownership and examine education outcomes. Chowa et al. (2013) finds that Ghanaian children in 
households which own at least one of five key assets – TV, refrigerators, electric iron, electric or gas 
stoves, and kerosene – outperformed the control group in English test scores. Similarly, Filmer and 
Pritchett (2001) constructs an asset-based wealth indicator in India and finds a rich-poor gap of 
more than 30 percent in school enrollment rates.  
 A common aspect of the literature establishing a positive link between increased asset 
ownership and improved child-education outcomes is the implicit assumption that the type of asset 
does not affect this relationship. Most studies either monetize or count asset holdings, converting all 
assets into a singular wealth scalar, and find a positive relationship between wealth and child 
education. A question I explore in this paper is whether an undifferentiated view of assets ignores 
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the potential for different types of assets to have varying effects on child education. More 
specifically, I explore whether agricultural assets discourage education investment, potentially by 
increasing the returns to child labor, while other assets could contribute to child education by 
increasing returns to schooling or raising the efficiencies of time spent studying (e.g. electricity, 
bicycle, and close source of water). 
If there are differential effects across different types of assets, there is likely significant scope 
to improve the design of asset transfer and public investment programs. A growing body of 
literature indicates that such programs usually transfer income generating assets such as livestock 
(Jodlowski et al. 2016; Kafle et al. 2016; Rawlins et al. 2014), agricultural inputs (Denning et al. 
2009), and other in-kind physical assets (Banerjee et al. 2015; Muralidharan and Prakash 2013). 
While physical asset transfers may provide a practical approach for programs aiming to improve 
livelihood outcomes in the short run, some assets could influence the returns to child labor in ways 
that discourage investment in formal education and hurt longer term economic development. 
My contribution to the literature is twofold. First, I establish a theoretical relation between 
different types of assets and child education under perfect and imperfect labor market conditions. In 
the empirical analysis, I provide evidence demonstrating that different types of assets have 
differential effects on child education. More specifically I show that household durables and housing 
quality indicators have expected positive effects but agricultural assets negatively affect child 
education. I also demonstrate that the negative effect of agricultural assets is more pronounced 
among rural children and children of crop producers, which I argue stems from higher opportunity 
cost of schooling. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. I provide a summary of related literature in 
section 2.2. In section 2.3, I present my theoretical model which builds on the Basu et al. (2010) 
model of child labor and landholding who adopted the framework of the agricultural household 
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model from (Singh, Squire and Strauss 1986). I extend the model to introduce an education 
production function which constrains the household’s utility maximization problem. In Section 2.4, 
I provide a brief overview of education system in Tanzania. Section 2.5 describes the data – three 
waves of the Tanzania National Panel Survey (NPS)2 – and empirical model followed by the results 
in section 2.6. As opposed to the undifferentiated view of assets, I disentangle assets into three 
groups – household durables, agricultural assets, and housing quality characteristics – and estimate 
the effect of each type of assets on children's educational outcomes and show that different types of 
assets have differential effects. Section 2.7 discusses policy implications and conclusions. 
 
2.2. Background 
  
The existing literature may have overlooked the causal relationship between household asset 
composition and child educational outcomes in developing countries (Elliott et al. 2011). A fairly 
large body of empirical studies examine the asset-child education relationship in developed countries 
but these studies often monetize asset holdings at some arbitrary market price and assess the 
relationship between the monetary value (also called wealth or net worth) and child education. Many 
studies are limited to the United States and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) but do find 
a significant positive impact of asset holding/net worth on children’s educational achievement 
(Elliott and Sherraden 2013; Loke 2013; Chowa et al. 2013; Huang 2013; Huang 2011; Shanks 2007; 
Zhan and Sherraden 2003; Conley 2001). For example, Huang (2013) uses the PSID data to examine 
the effects of household assets (net worth) on transmission of parental abilities to child educational 
achievement and finds a causal relationship. Conley (2001) also uses the PSID data to investigate the 
effect of assets on children’s post-secondary education and finds that children from asset rich 
                                                          
2 The Tanzania NPS is part of the LSMS-ISA program which aims to marry complex consumption-based 
household surveys with plot-crop detailed agricultural surveys. The Tanzania NPS data, along with details on 
the sample and instrument design, are publicly available.     
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households perform better in post-secondary education. Similarly, Kim and Sherraden (2011) 
assesses the effect of parental asset holding ($ value) on educational attainment of high school and 
college students using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 and also finds a 
positive relation between parental net worth and child education. In particular, Conley finds a 
positive causal relation between child educational attainment and homeownership and financial 
assets. Other researchers who examine the effect of assets on child education also find similar results 
but argue that the effect is more pronounced on early childhood (Huang 2011) and operates through 
mother’s expectations of their children’s educational achievement (Loke 2013).  
The assets-child education relationship is largely understudied in developing countries 
probably because appropriate data are rarely available. A recent study in China uses data from 2002 
China Household Income Project and shows a significant causal relationship between net worth and 
liquid assets and educational attainment of children (Deng et al. 2014). Similar results are reported 
from Ghana where Chowa et al. (2013) uses data from a field experiment among Ghanaian youth, 
Ghana Youth Save Experiment. In particular, their results indicate that youth from households that 
own at least one of the five key assets that are considered primary indicators of socioeconomic 
status – TV, refrigerators, electric iron, electric or gas stoves, and kerosene – outperformed the 
youth from control households in English test scores by at least one point. Despite some evidence 
of causal relation between assets and child education, confusion prevails as to what particular school 
outcomes to consider. Some studies measure child education with school enrollment (Filmer and 
Pritchett 2001) but others use test scores (Cockburn and Dostie 2007) or grade completed (Deng et 
al. 2014). Filmer and Pritchett (2001) examines the relationship between assets (net worth) and 
school enrollment and finds a wide gap in the school enrollment rate between rich and poor children 
in India; children from rich households are 31% more likely to be enrolled than children from poor 
households. Cockburn and Dostie (2007) investigates the relationship between time allocation and 
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educational performance among Ethiopian children and reports a positive effect of having a close 
source of water on child education. 
 The scant body of empirical literature on child education-assets relationship lacks a strong 
theoretical support. Cockburn and Dostie (2007) uses a variant of the agricultural household model 
and demonstrates that the effect of assets on child education varies with the type of assets. 
Cockburn and Dostie’s point is that whenever the expected return to schooling is less than the 
return to child labor, providing households with more assets can have adverse effects on child 
education because child labor demand increases with asset holdings. That child labor adversely 
affects child education is a common finding in the existing literature on this issue and enjoys strong 
theoretical and empirical support (Haile and Haile 2012; Basu, Das, and Datta 2010). As in 
Cockburn and Dostie (2007), Basu, Das and Dutta (2010) examines the effect of land holdings on 
child labor in rural India and discovers that when the labor market is missing, land holding size and 
child labor have an inverted U-shaped relationship. The main message from these studies is that 
when the labor market is complete, increase in household wealth can decrease child labor and result 
improved child education. However, when the labor market is missing or imperfect, the effect of 
land holding on child labor (hence child education) is ambiguous (Basu et al. 2010). Basu and 
colleagues demonstrate that when the labor market is missing, the net effect of wealth (land) on 
child labor (education) depends on the specification of underlying utility and production functions.  
While Cockburn and Dostie (2007) and Basu et al. (2010) provide a theoretical 
understanding of household wealth (land holding in both cases) and child labor, they do not provide 
evidence on how other household assets affect child labor and child education. Basu and colleagues 
estimated the effect of land holdings only and Cockburn and Dostie (2011) did not specifically test 
the hypothesis that different asset types have differential effects on child education. The present 
paper empirically tests whether different types of assets have differential effects on child education 
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and whether the effect of labor complementary assets is negative. In so doing, I first examine the 
data to verify that agricultural asset holding predicts child labor in agriculture, in my sample. I 
estimate a probit regression of child labor on all three types of assets and other control covariates 
for each of the three waves of the Tanzania LSMS survey. The results indicate that agricultural assets 
increase the likelihood of child labor but household durables and housing quality assets either 
decrease or have no effect on child labor (Table A2 in Appendix A). The rest of the analysis 
considers child labor as a potential mechanism for the causal effect of assets on child education. 
Next, I provide a theoretical model to demonstrate the relationship between child labor and 
household asset holdings.  
 
2.3. Theoretical Model and Results 
 
While the hypothesis that different types of assets can have differential effects on child 
education is intuitively appealing and empirically testable, there has been significantly less 
development on the theory of this relationship. A handful of studies model asset-education 
relationship using some variants of the agricultural household model, but they do not differentiate 
between types of assets. My theoretical exposition builds on the model of child labor and 
landholding presented in Basu et al. (2010) who adapted the framework of the agricultural 
household model from Sing, Squire, and Strauss (1986). I start with the basic structure as described 
in Basu et al. (2010) and introduce an education production function which constrains the 
household’s utility maximization problem. I consider two different scenarios under each of two 
labor market conditions; the perfect labor market and missing labor market. In one case, the 
household is constrained by an education production function and in the other case it is not. My 
primary interest is in the interactions between assets and human capital investments in education 
and so in both cases I include education production functions. Nonetheless, for completeness, I 
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summarize the results from all four cases – perfect and missing labor market with and without 
education production function – in Table 2.1. In this analysis, I first demonstrate the effect of asset 
holding on child labor and household consumption in the settings of a perfect labor market. I then 
switch to the case of missing labor markets. In either case, I explicitly assume that child labor 
adversely affects child educational outcomes. Therefore, my theoretical analysis portrays the effect 
of assets on child education through child labor but does not attempt to find direct effects on child 
education. 
 
2.3.1. Basic structure 
Consider an economy where each household has one adult and one child. The adult always 
prefers to work and takes no leisure. The child either works or goes to school but takes no leisure. 
Suppose each household is endowed with the following utility function.  
 
 
𝑢 = 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙) 
(
(2.1) 
 
where c is the total consumption and l∈ [0,1] is child labor hours, 0 indicates no child labor and 1 
indicates no school/study hours. Since the adult always prefers to work, the total labor supply of the 
household is always 1+l. The aggregate consumption good c increases utility but labor accrues 
disutility. I assume that the utility function is smooth and quasi-concave and the following 
relationship holds: 𝑢𝑐 > 0, 𝑢𝑐𝑐 ≤ 0, 𝑢𝑙 < 0, and 𝑢𝑙𝑙 ≤ 0. Similarly, I assume that the cross 
marginal utilities are negative;  𝑢𝑐𝑙 , 𝑢𝑙𝑐 < 0.
3 Each household faces a budget constraint, is engaged in 
                                                          
3 These are a reasonable assumption because utility increases with consumption (𝑢𝑐 > 0) but at a decreasing 
rate (𝑢𝑐𝑐 < 0) i.e. diminishing marginal utility. In case of labor, utility decreases with labor (𝑢𝑙 < 0) and it 
does so at an increasing rate (𝑢𝑙𝑙 < 0). The marginal disutility from labor increases with labor. I also assume 
that the marginal utility of consumption decreases with labor i.e. 𝑢𝑐𝑙 , 𝑢𝑙𝑐 < 0.  
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some kind of household production activity, and owns agricultural assets (K) and non-agricultural 
assets (A). If a household has a school attending child, the household also faces an education 
production function, and is liable to the cost of schooling, pq. 
 
2.3.2. The Perfect labor market case 
When a well-functioning labor market exists, household can supply labor to off-farm 
activities and hire labor to work on its farm. All households are price takers and hire in/out labor at 
a market wage rate, w. Following Basu et al. (2010), I assume that both adults and children earn 
exactly the same wage. Suppose each household faces a production function, 𝑄(𝐿, 𝐾), and an 
education production function, 𝑞(𝑠, 𝐴, 𝜃)4, where L is total labor used in household production, K 
is household’s agricultural asset holding, s=1-l is total school/study hours, A is household’s non-
agricultural asset holding which may directly affect child education, and θ denotes ‘other factors’ that 
affect child education. For simplicity, I suppress θ and assume the education production function to 
be linear on school hours i.e. 𝑞(𝑠, 𝐴) = 𝑠 + 𝑞(𝐴). The household production function is quasi-
concave and therefore, 𝑄𝐿 , 𝑄𝐾 > 0; 𝑄𝐿𝐿 < 0; 𝑄𝐿𝐾 > 0. I assume 𝑞𝑠, 𝑞𝐴 > 0 and 𝑞𝑠𝑠 = 0. The 
household’s problem is:  
 
 max
𝑐,𝑙 
   𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙)   subject to 
𝑄 = 𝑄(𝐿, 𝐾)  
𝑞 = 𝑞(𝑠, 𝐴) and 
𝑐 + 𝑝𝑞𝑞 = 𝑄 + 𝑦 + 𝑤(𝐻 − 𝐿)  
 
(
(2.2) 
 
                                                          
4 To the best of my knowledge, no previous studies introduced education production function in the settings 
of agricultural-household model. Introducing education production function may make the model 
complicated but the added complications help us understand the potential effects of assets and tools that are 
not used in agricultural production and may have direct impact on child education. Most agricultural 
households in developing countries face a decision of sending children to school or not.  
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where Q is output produced, q is children’s educational outcomes, 𝑝𝑞 is unit cost of child education, 
y is non-labor income, and H = 1+ l is total labor supply of the household. The household supplies 
labor off-farm if H > L and hires labor from outside if H < L. Since the labor market is well-
functioning and the household can hire in/out labor as needed, the production decision is separable 
from the consumption decision. If a household possesses K units of agricultural assets, it can earn a 
profit of 𝜋(𝑤, 𝐾). Therefore, 𝑐 + 𝑝𝑞𝑞 = 𝜋(𝑤, 𝐾) + 𝑤𝐻 + y. The household’s problem simplifies 
to  
 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙) − 𝜆[𝑐 + 𝑝𝑞𝑞 − 𝜋(𝑤, 𝐾) − 𝑤(1 + 𝑙) − 𝑦] (2.3) 
 
Rearranging the first order condition from equation (2.3) gives us the following expressions 
i.)  
𝑢𝑙
𝑢𝑐
≡ 𝑍 = −(𝑝𝑞 + 𝑤) 
ii.)  𝑐 + 𝑝𝑞𝑞 =  𝜋(𝑤, 𝐾) + 𝑤(1 + 𝑙) + 𝑦 
Totally differentiating the above expressions with respect to K and solving the resulting 
equations, we get  
 
𝛿𝑙
𝛿𝐾
=  −
𝑧𝑐𝜋𝐾
𝑧𝑐(𝑝𝑞 + 𝑤) + 𝑧𝑙
 and 
𝛿𝑐
𝛿𝐾
=  
𝑧𝑙𝜋𝐾
𝑧𝑐(𝑝𝑞 + 𝑤) + 𝑧𝑙
 
By assumption, 𝜋𝐾 > 0, 𝑞𝑠 > 0, and I can demonstrate that 𝑧𝑐 < 0, 𝑧𝑙 < 0.
5 Therefore, when the 
labor market is perfect, agricultural asset accumulation at the household level decreases child labor, 
i.e. 
𝛿𝑙
𝛿𝐾
< 0 but increases household consumption i.e. 
𝛿𝑐
𝛿𝐾
> 0. Similarly, differentiating expressions i.) 
and ii.) with respect to income y gives us the following conditions. 
                                                          
5 I view this as a reasonable assumption because marginal rate of substitution between child labor and 
consumption may decrease with consumption, i.e. 𝑧𝑐 =
𝛿
𝛿𝑐
𝑢𝑙
𝑢𝑐
=
𝑢𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑐−𝑢𝑙𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
2 < 0 because 𝑢𝑐 > 0, 𝑢𝑙𝑐 < 0 
and 𝑢𝑙 , 𝑢𝑐𝑐 < 0, by assumption. Similarly, 𝑧𝑙 < 0. 
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𝛿𝑙
𝛿𝑦
=  −
𝑧𝑐
𝑧𝑐𝑤 + 𝑧𝑙
< 0 and 
𝛿𝑐
𝛿𝑦
=  
𝑧𝑙
𝑧𝑐𝑤 + 𝑧𝑙
> 0 
This indicates that exogenous increase in income or assets unambiguously reduces child labor and 
increases consumption when the labor market is perfect. This is consistent with previous findings 
that an exogenous increase in land holdings decreases child labor when the labor market functions 
perfectly (Basu et al. 2010; Dostie and Cockburn 2007). However, further analysis shows that, unlike 
agricultural assets, increase in education-specific assets has negative effects on household 
consumption (
𝛿𝑐
𝛿𝐴
< 0) and positive effects on child labor (
𝛿𝑙
𝛿𝐴
> 0).6 Because child takes no leisure in 
this model, any gain in time spent studying due to education-specific assets is recorded as increase in 
child labor hours. Results imply that, when the labor market functions perfectly, the income effect 
on child labor is always negative but the effect of assets depends on the type of assets. Since assets 
are likely to affect household income, the net effect of increase in assets is ambiguous. The 
ambiguity gets more complicated when the labor market is missing.  
 
2.3.3. The missing labor market case 
In this case each household’s consumption decisions are non-separable from production 
decisions. No outside labor is hired and no household labor is supplied to off-farm activities. Since 
the market wage does not exist, the household’s problem in (2.2) can be modified as 
 max
𝑐,𝑙 
𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙)  subject to 
𝑄 = 𝑄(𝐿, 𝐾), 
𝑞 = 𝑞(𝑠, 𝐴) and 𝑐 + 𝑝𝑞𝑞 = 𝑄 + 𝑦 
 
(2.4) 
 
                                                          
6 Differentiating conditions i) and ii) with respect to non-agricultural assets (A), I get, 
 
𝛿𝑙
𝛿𝐴
=  
𝑧𝑐𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐴
𝑧𝑐(𝑝𝑞+𝑤)+𝑧𝑙
> 0 and 
𝛿𝑐
𝛿𝐴
= −
𝑧𝑙𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐴
𝑧𝑐(𝑝𝑞+𝑤)+𝑧𝑙
< 0.  
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Because of non-separability, the household’s problem simplifies to  
 
 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙) − 𝜆[𝑐 + 𝑝𝑞𝑞(𝑠, 𝐴) − 𝑄(𝐿, 𝐾) − 𝑦] (2.5) 
 
Solving the equation (2.5) gives us the following first order conditions (FOCs) 
iii.) 
𝑢𝑙
𝑢𝑐
≡ 𝑍 = −(𝑝𝑞 + 𝑄𝐿) 
iv.)  𝑐 + 𝑝𝑞𝑞 = 𝑄 + 𝑦 
Differentiating the first order conditions with respect to agricultural assets, K, I get 
𝛿𝑙
𝛿𝐾
=  −
𝑄𝐾𝑧𝑐 + 𝑄𝐿𝐾
 𝛽
 
where 𝛽 = 𝑧𝑙 + 𝑄𝐿𝐿 + 𝑧𝑐(𝑝𝑞 + 𝑄𝐿𝐿) < 0 
The denominator (β) is always negative but the sign of numerator depends on the sign of the 
expression 𝑄𝐾𝑧𝑐 + 𝑄𝐿𝐾. As I assume 𝑄𝐾, 𝑄𝐿𝐾 > 0 and 𝑧𝑐 < 0, this implies that the effect of 
agricultural assets on child labor is ambiguous; it can increase or decrease child labor depending on 
the magnitude of the change in the marginal product of labor caused by additional agricultural 
assets. The ambiguous effect is further complicated because assets contribute to household income 
and the income effect on child labor may work in a different direction than the direct effects of 
assets. To understand the income effect, I differentiate the FOCs with respect to non-labor income 
y; I get 
𝛿𝑙
𝛿𝑦
=  −
𝑧𝑐
 𝛽
< 0. Unlike agricultural assets, the increase in income decreases child labor, 
unambiguously. Similarly, the income effect on household consumption is always positive as 
𝛿𝑐
𝛿𝑦
=
 
𝑧𝑙+𝑄𝐿𝐿
 𝛽
> 0. 
I summarize theoretical results in Table 2.1. Results in case 1 and case 3 are essentially 
replication of Basu et al. (2010) and Dostie and Cockburn (2007) except that I use agricultural assets 
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in general as opposed to land ownership as the sole asset in these studies. Case 2 and case 4 are 
novel and more realistic in that they consider both household and education production functions 
and explicitly model the cost of education. Overall, the results imply that the effects of an exogenous 
increase in assets and income are clearly discernable when labor market is perfect. When no labor 
market exists and households have to make production and consumption decisions simultaneously, 
non-labor income and education-specific assets still have clearly discernible effects on child labor 
and consumption but the effects of assets used in agricultural production is more complicated to 
understand (Table 2.1). 
If the expected return to schooling is sufficiently high, then an increase in both agricultural 
asset holdings can decrease child labor and improve child education. This is consistent with 
economic theory of factor productivity in that child labor increases when the return to labor is 
higher than the expected return to schooling and child school hours increase when expected return 
to schooling is higher. I resort to empirical analysis to help unpack the ambiguous effect of assets on 
child education. My empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical results as household 
income always has positive effect on child education and the effect of assets depends on types of 
assets. The rest of the paper focuses on empirical analysis. First, I provide an overview of Tanzanian 
educational system followed by nature of the data and research method I employ. I then discuss my 
empirical findings before I make concluding remarks. 
 
2.4. Education System in Tanzania 
 
Tanzania participated in the ‘World Conference on Education’ held in Dakar in 2000 and 
has since actively participated and committed to the UNESCO’s mission of ‘Education for All 
(EFA)”. It also considers education as one of the key sectors to achieve the goals of the Tanzania 
Development Vision 2025 (MoEVT 2014). In Tanzania, the government is the largest provider of 
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education and it allocates more budget in education than other African countries; it spends 26% of 
government expenditure on education compared to the regional average of 21%. Public expenditure 
favors primary education while secondary education in the country receives less funding than the 
regional average (UNESCO 2011). Recently, a remarkable improvement has been made in access to 
secondary school but the retention rate is still strikingly low and it is often associated with economic 
hardship, cultural barriers, and other factors contributing to low school demand (UNESCO 2011). 
As a result, Tanzania still has an enormous gap in skilled workers required to realize its goal of 
reaching Middle Income Country (MIC) status by 2025; for example, calculations based on the 2007 
Integrated Labor Force Survey indicated that more than 275% more teachers are needed in the 
education sector. In addition, 80% of Tanzania’s workforce is still in agriculture, an astonishing 37% 
of school age children are engaged in economic activities, and the adult literacy rate is below the 
average of other developing countries (UNESCO 2011; MoEVT 2014). While Tanzania’s education 
sector enjoys a high budget priority, the country lags other low income countries in educational 
outcomes.  
This analysis assesses child educational outcomes in the context of progression through the 
Tanzanian school system, represented in Figure 2.1. Tanzania follows a 2-7-4-2-3+ model of 
education that starts with 2 years of pre-primary school followed by 7 years of primary school which 
consists grades 1 to 7 and marks its completion with a national level examination called primary 
school leaving exam (PSLE) at the end of the 7th grade (MoEVT 2014). A pass score in the PSLE 
test is required to proceed to government secondary school. Those who fail the PSLE test can either 
retake the exam, proceed to private secondary school, or end their formal education. The first tier of 
secondary school ends after four years of schooling with another national level examination called 
Form IV exam (FIVE), alternatively O+ exam, at the end of grade 11.  
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Students passing the FIVE test can proceed to the second tier of secondary school and those 
who fail the FIVE test can either retake the exam or enroll in vocational courses (MS+). After two 
years of schooling at the higher secondary level, students take yet another national level examination, 
Form VI exam (also called A+ exam) at the end of the 13th grade. Students passing the A+ exam can  
go to university directly, but those who fail the exam have to pass a diploma course before they can 
go to university. Students are selected for further formal or non-formal education based on their 
performance on A+ exam. Secondary school with A+ exam in Tanzania is equivalent to a high 
school diploma in the United States and students who pass the exam can attend universities which 
consists three plus years of formal education.  
 
2.5. Data and Method  
2.5.1. Data 
I use the data from three waves of Tanzania National Panel Survey (NPS), also called 
Tanzania LSMS. The NPS is a nationally representative survey that is implemented by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of Tanzania with technical support from the World Bank. I use three survey 
rounds with 3265 households in the baseline (2008/09), 3924 households in the second wave 
(2010/11), and 5015 households in the third wave (2012/13). The increase in the sample size is due 
to household splits. The NPS maintains a relatively low attrition rate (4.8%) at the household level 
across all the three waves of the survey. The number of observations at the individual level increased 
from 16,709 in the baseline to 20,599 and 25,412 in the second and third waves, respectively. The 
overall attrition rate at the individual level is 7.5%. In all the survey rounds, the NPS follows the 
same households and eligible members of the households. All household members of age 15 or 
older (excluding live-in servants) are considered eligible. Households and individuals are tracked to 
new locations when necessary. In this study, I use a balanced sample from the three survey rounds. 
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The full panel contains 3088 households and 14,577 individuals. For the highest grade completed, I 
use a panel of 4112 children from 2241 households who have once attended school and are 6-18 
years old during the first wave. Similarly, for the PSLE variable, I use a panel of 3101 households 
having at least one PSLE eligible child of ages 6-18. A panel of 2696 households with at least one 
FIVE eligible adolescent of ages16-24 is used for the FIVE variable. 
 
2.5.2. Asset variables 
  
Assets are broadly defined and they include household durables, housing quality 
characteristics, and agricultural assets. Household durables include tools and equipment used in the 
household such as television, radio, cellphone, bicycle etc. Housing quality characteristics consist 
information about type of floor, roof, and wall materials, number of rooms, access to electricity, safe 
drinking water, toilet facility etc. Similarly, agricultural assets include farm tools, equipment, 
livestock, and livestock related assets. Since each asset group consists of several individual assets, I 
run into a problem of finding appropriate weight for each asset. Including individual assets as 
explanatory variables in the regression equation correctly assigns weights but may not be pragmatic 
because it provides no measure of total wealth. Several previous studies rely on the principal 
component approach which assigns weight to the components based on their variance. The first 
principal component is considered to serve as a proxy for socioeconomic status as it captures the 
largest variation in assets (Filmer and Scott 2008; Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006; McKenzie 2005; 
Filmer and Pritchett 2001). I use the principal component approach to create asset indexes for the 
three different asset types – household durable assets, agricultural assets, and housing quality 
characteristics. Table A1 in Appendix A presents a list of individual assets under each category with 
their scoring factors – weight that is used to calculate the first principal component. The first 
component accounts for more than 26% variation in each case. In this analysis I am interested on 
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the effect of all three indexes – household durable index, agricultural asset index, and housing quality 
index – on child education.  
Demographic controls in the econometric analysis include individual level variables (age, age 
started school, number of siblings, and maximum parent’s education) and household level variables 
(age, sex, and marital status of household head and logarithm of total consumption expenditure). 
Other controls include binary indicators for school in local community7, rural vs urban household, 
economic shock in the last 12 months, and household’s access to credit and saving facilities. 
Whenever the outcome variable is at the household level, no individual level control variables are 
included in the model. 
 
2.5.3. Outcome variables 
Based on the educational system in Tanzania, outcomes of interest for this analysis are the 
highest grade completed, the proportion of children in the household who pass the PSLE (PSLE 
ratio), and the proportion of children who pass the FIVE (FIVE ratio). The highest grade completed 
is a count variable ranging from 1 to 25. A grade of 25 marks the end of advanced university degree 
(eg. a PhD in the United States). For the highest grade completed, only the individuals who are 6-18 
in the first round are included in the analysis. Individuals who have never attended school are not 
included because both school outcome and school related explanatory variables are missing for 
them. Individuals with informal schooling like adult education and other skill development trainings 
also are excluded. Current students are included with their highest grade completed calculated as 
their current grade minus one. As the results are conditional on attending school, inference from my 
empirical results on the effects of assets on highest grade completed should be taken with caution. 
                                                          
7 School in local community is coded 1 when the community has a primary school or a secondary school, or 
both, and 0 if no school.  
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While the highest grade completed is measured over individuals, the two pass ratios are 
measured at the household level, but both of them are based on children’s individual performance in 
national examinations. The exam scores are recorded as pass or fail and individuals who pass the 
exam once will never retake the exam. On average 65% of students pass the test in the first attempt 
and retake rate among failing students is very low. In particular, only about 13% of students failing 
in the first attempt pass the test in the second attempt. As a result, students passing the exam in the 
first attempt are coded 1 in all waves and the majority of students failing in the first attempt are 
coded 0 in all waves. Since there is little to no variation in individuals’ outcomes over time, I create a 
household-level measure of performance to capture the impact of assets on educational outcomes. 
The PSLE ratio is the number of children in the household who pass the PSLE over the total 
number of children aged 6 to 18 in the same household. Similarly, the FIVE ratio is the proportion 
of the number of youth in the household who passed the FIVE to the total number of adolescents 
of age 18 to 24 in the same household. As these proportions can represent performance of school 
age children at the household level only, using these ratios limits my ability to make inference about 
individual performance in the PSLE and FIVE exams. 
 
2.5.4. Econometric model 
My empirical approach considers the missing labor market case explained in section 2.3.3 
because my sample consists primarily of agricultural households in rural settings. As described in 
section 2.3.2, children's educational performance (q) is determined by school hours (s), non-
agricultural assets (A), and other factors (θ). Assume that the other factors include parental 
characteristics, household income (I), and child's individual ability (𝐶𝑢) and school hours depends on 
agricultural assets (K), and household income. Parental characteristics consist of observed characters 
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such as education (𝑃𝑒) and unobserved characters such as ability (𝑃𝑢). Conceptually, child education 
is a function of parental characteristics, child ability, assets, and income. That is,  
 
 𝑞 = 𝑃𝑒 + 𝑃𝑢 + 𝐶𝑢 + 𝐴 + 𝐾 + 𝐼 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟  (2.6) 
   
We know that certain parental characteristics such as hereditary trait and other abilities directly 
transmit to their children, i.e. 𝐶𝑢 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑢) + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟. This implies that children’s educational 
outcomes can be predicted by observed parental characteristics, child’s ability, assets, and income i.e. 
𝑞 = 𝑃𝑒 + ?̌?𝑢 + 𝐴 + 𝐾 + 𝐼 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟. Note that ?̌?𝑢 = 𝐶𝑢 + 𝑓
−1(𝐶𝑢) is unobserved ability that is 
both inherited from parents and specific to the individual child. Since the parental ability is 
correlated with parental education and household asset accumulation, the unobserved child ability 
(𝐶𝑢) is also correlated with both of them i.e. 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝐶𝑢, 𝑃𝑒) ≠ 0 and 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝐶𝑢, 𝐴) ≠ 0.  
Since the observed and unobserved variables are correlated and affect child education, I face 
the problem of endogeneity. This is a concern which the existing literature has not addressed 
(Lerman and McKernan 2013; Elliott et al. 2011). I assume that these unobserved characteristics are 
time invariant and address the endogeneity problem empirically using panel data. I start with the 
following model for panel data. 
 
   𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥1𝑖𝑡𝛼 +  𝑥2𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑧1𝑖𝜃 + 𝑧2𝑖𝛾 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2.7) 
 
where i indicates individual and t indicates time, or survey round. Thus, 𝑞𝑖𝑡 is child i’s education 
outcome at time t, 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 is a vector of time-varying exogenous variables such as age and household 
size, 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 is a vector of time-varying endogenous variables such as assets, 𝑧1𝑖 is a vector of time 
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invariant exogenous variables such as gender and age started school, 𝑧2𝑖 is a vector of time invariant 
endogenous variables such as maximum parent's education, 𝑢𝑖 is a time invariant individual effect 
which consists of unobserved individual abilities correlated with both asset ownership and parental 
education, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is idiosyncratic error term. Equation (2.7) provides a required structure for an 
instrumental variable estimator proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) (hereafter referred to as 
HTIV) to address this endogeneity problem.  
The HTIV model relies on instruments but the instruments come from within the model; 
𝑧1𝑖 serves as an instrument for itself, the within transformations 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 −  ?̅?1𝑖   and 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 −  ?̅?2𝑖 serve as 
valid instruments for 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 and 𝑥2𝑖𝑡, respectively and the between transformation ?̅?1𝑖 serves as a valid 
instrument for 𝑧2𝑖. Conditions (i) and (ii) are both necessary and sufficient conditions for the HTIV 
estimator to produce unbiased estimates. 
i.) 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝑥2𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0, 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝑧2𝑖) ≠ 0  
ii.) 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝑥1𝑖𝑡) = 0, 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝑧1𝑖) = 0 and 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝑥1𝑖𝑡, 𝑥2𝑖𝑡, 𝑧1𝑖, 𝑧2𝑖) = 0 
In this analysis, I assume that the idiosyncratic error term is correlated with no explanatory variables 
but the unobserved specific effect is correlated with both asset indexes (𝑥2𝑖𝑡) and parental education 
(𝑧2𝑖).  
Estimating equation (2.7) with the random effects model yields inconsistent estimates 
because the ‘zero correlation’ assumption is clearly violated. The fixed effects model and the HTIV 
method8 both yield consistent estimates, but the HTIV approach is more efficient and can estimate 
coefficient estimates on time constant variables as well (Baltagi, Bresson and Pirotte 2003; Hausman 
                                                          
8 In practice, HTIV can be estimated using the STATA in-built command ‘Xthtaylor’. I use the Xthtaylor 
command specifying asset indexes and parental education as endogenous variables. Conceptually, first, 
equation (2.7) is estimated with the fixed effects model saving the residual. The residual is used to run a 
regression on 𝑧1𝑖 and 𝑧2𝑖 by using 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 and 𝑧1𝑖 as instruments. All variables in the model are then 
transformed by using the estimated variance from the residual regression. The transformed model is 
estimated by using 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 −  ?̅?1𝑖, 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 −  ?̅?2𝑖, 𝑧1𝑖 and ?̅?1𝑖 as instruments. 
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and Taylor 1981). Efficiency gain is particularly important for this analysis because the data comes 
from a comprehensive nationally representative survey which is likely suffered from unforeseen 
measurement errors. Also, I would like to estimate the effects of time constant variables like parent’s 
education and gender. For these reasons, my preferred method is HTIV. However, for comparison 
purposes, I provide results from three different estimators – random effects model, fixed effects 
model, and the HTIV model. 
 
2.6. Results  
 2.6.1. Summary statistics  
Summary statistics are presented in Tables 2.2-2.4. All point estimates are weighted to allow 
inferences to the population of either individuals or households, depending on the variable. Table 
2.2 presents demographic characteristics of sample in all three waves. The first panel presents 
individual characteristics, middle panel presents household characteristics, and the last panel 
presents characteristics of the household head. Tanzania has a very young population with the 
average age of 21 years in baseline, 23 in the second wave, and 24 years in the third survey wave. 
Based on those who have attended school, the average school starting age is 8 which is higher than 
the regional average of 7 years for sub-Saharan Africa. The average household size is about 5 in all 
three waves and about half of them are children ages 6-18 years. Parental and household head’s 
characteristics are important for the analysis because effect of assets on child education mostly 
operates through parental decisions about child labor, schooling, and intra-household resource 
allocation. Parental education is measured with ‘maximum parent’s education’, the maximum level of 
father and mother’s level of education. As a vast majority of parents in my sample are not current 
students, I keep parental education constant across waves. On average, both parents and household 
heads have attended primary school but about 20 percent of the heads are still illiterate. Other 
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characteristics of household head includes age, gender, and marital status. Household heads are 
relatively young with the average age of 45 years in baseline, 47 in the second wave, and about 49 in 
the third wave. On average, more than 70 percent of household heads are married but gender 
balance of headship is skewed to males; only about 25 percent households are female headed. 
Apart from individual and household head’s characteristics, effects of assets may differ by 
income level, rural and urban areas, household’s response to transitory shocks, and access to school 
in local community. Apparently, even though my sample comprises more than 70 percent rural 
households, a strikingly large proportion (90 percent) of households have access to primary or 
secondary school in village. Access to primary and secondary schools in rural areas signals large 
public investment in child education but the quality of education is not known. Descriptive results 
also indicate an increased resilience over time; 78 percent households experienced negative 
economic shock at some point of time but the poverty rates did not increase. Consistent with 
reduction in national poverty rates (World Bank 2015), average annual household consumption 
expenditure increased over time from 2.5 million Tanzanian Shilling in baseline to 3.8 million 
Shilling in the third wave. 
Children’s educational outcomes are summarized in Table 2.3. As educational outcomes are 
not available for children who have never attended school, both my summary statistics and empirical 
results are conditional on attending school. I track the cohort of 6 to 18 year old children in baseline 
to estimate the effect of assets on ‘highest grade completed’. On average, children in my sample 
have completed 5th grade in baseline, 7th grade in the second wave and 9th grade in the third wave. As 
the primary school leaving exam (PSLE) and Form IV exam (FIVE) data are not available for the 
first wave, I use the PSLE and FIVE data from the second and third NPS surveys only. Even 
though passing rate for both PSLE and FIVE tests is higher than 65 percent in both waves, only a 
small proportion of eligible children passed the tests because a majority of school-age children were 
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not enrolled in school and had no opportunity to take the tests. Nevertheless, the proportion of 
school-age children passing PSLE test has increased over time from 18 percent in 2010 to 23 
percent in 2012. Similar pattern holds for the FIVE test. Descriptive statistics of asset indexes across 
three waves are presented in Table 2.4. Since I calculate asset indexes at the household level, I 
assume that all children within a household have equal access to household assets. On average, all 
asset index values are small but agricultural asset index is not significantly different from zero in 
either wave. Household durable index is negative in baseline but it’s not different from zero in 
follow up rounds. Housing quality index is negative in baseline and significantly improves over time. 
 
 2.6.2. Empirical results  
I first examine the data to verify that agricultural asset holding predicts child labor in 
agriculture. I pooled the data from the three waves and estimate a pooled probit regression of child 
labor on all three types of assets for various sub-samples. Results indicate that agricultural assets 
increase the likelihood of child labor among crop producers and rural households in general, but 
children are less likely to engage in any labor generating activity with increased ownership of 
household durables and housing quality assets (Appendix A Table A2). This finding supports my 
assumption that effects of assets on child education operate through child labor. Next I estimate the 
effect of asset holding on children’s educational outcomes. 
 
Effects of assets on highest grade completed  
I estimate the effects of assets on highest grade completed using equation (2.7) for two 
different model specifications with three different panel estimators; random effects, fixed effects, 
and HTIV models. Both specifications are exactly the same in all but the treatment of asset 
variables. The first specification in Table 2.5 does not allow differential effects of assets as it 
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aggregates all assets into the same index but the second specification includes all three disaggregated 
asset indexes (Table 2.6). Results in Table 2.7 also come from the second specification estimated 
with my preferred HTIV model for various subsamples. Standard errors are clustered at the 
household level in all regressions. Tables are structured such that results in the first column are 
obtained from the random effects model which is inconsistent under conditions (i) and (ii) in section 
2.5.4. Under the same conditions, results in the second and third columns are consistent as they are 
obtained from the fixed effects and HTIV models, respectively. Results in the third column are my 
preferred results because HTIV approach is more efficient than fixed effects model. 
Table 2.5 presents the effect of aggregated asset index on children’s highest grade 
completed. The aggregated asset index has the expected sign suggesting positive wealth effects on 
children’s education. Positive coefficient on consumption expenditure, proxy for household income, 
also suggests positive income effects. Among other controls, both having educated parents and 
access to a school in village help children achieve higher grades; about 5 percent increase in total 
expenditure and increase in parental education by one more level (such as primary to secondary 
school) have identical effect on child education. Educated parents may see larger expected return 
from sending kids to school so the opportunity cost of schooling may not be as high for their 
children. Similarly, children who live nearby a school may manage to both attend school and take 
part in farm-household activities occasionally. This would lead to the positive effect of ‘school in 
village’ variable even when child labor is employed in agriculture. Results indicate that, after 
controlling for endogeneity, effect of parental education on children’s highest grade completed gets 
more than four times bigger than it was with the random effects model. This implies the potential 
endogeneity of parental education and shows the importance of using HTIV method over the fixed 
effect model. Interestingly, having a male head of household adversely effects children’s grade level 
but girls are more likely to achieve higher grades than boys. This is consistent with existing evidence 
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from developing countries that boys are more likely to forgo school for agricultural activities in 
comparison to girls who usually take care of household and kitchen activities (Akresh et al. 2013; 
Burke and Beegle 2004). The level of education increases with age but late school starters hurt their 
chances of achieving higher grades. Finally, household size has smaller but significant negative effect 
on child education suggesting any increase in household size reduces child education. 
In Table 2.6, I disaggregate assets to three different groups – household durables, 
agricultural assets, and housing quality assets. Although results in Table 2.5 suggest that assets 
uniformly contribute to child education through positive wealth effects, results in Table 2.6 suggest 
different types of assets have differential effects on child education. Household durables and 
housing quality characteristics have the expected positive effects but agricultural assets have negative 
effects on children’s highest grade completed. As agricultural assets include farm tools and 
equipment, land, and livestock, owning more agricultural assets may increase the opportunity cost of 
schooling and lead to higher child labor demand which contributes to school dropout. Overall, the 
adverse effect of agricultural assets is more than offset by household durables and good housing 
characteristics as the later have larger positive effects than agricultural assets. The estimated effects 
of other variables including access to school in village are qualitatively identical to the results 
presented in Table 2.5 and discussed above.  
The evidence of negative effects of agricultural assets on the grade level completed is 
particularly striking because it is in contrast to the traditional view of positive wealth effect on 
education. Agricultural assets (or any productive assets) are a form of wealth, but they may behave 
differently than durable assets and housing quality assets in that the productive assets incur labor 
and other input cost to be operational. Ownership of agricultural assets may indicate wealth 
acquisition but it may increase the opportunity cost of schooling and child labor demand, especially 
among agrarian households which have no or limited access to labor market. The evidence points 
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that an undifferentiated view of assets is misleading. Because ownership of agricultural assets 
increases the likelihood of child labor in own-farm activities (Appendix A Table A2), the results also 
imply that the opportunity cost of schooling rises with agricultural assets presumably through an 
effect on child labor in farming. 
That different assets have differential effects and agricultural assets increase child labor in 
agriculture is a striking result for policy makers and planners and deserves further exploration. In 
Table 2.7, I estimate my preferred HTIV model for various sub-samples to identify the potential 
mechanism behind the differential effects of different types of assets. I estimate the model for eight 
different sub-samples – rural, urban, crop producers, livestock keepers, boys, girls, poor, non-poor – 
and results indicate that different types of assets have differential effects among rural children or 
children from crop producers. Although aggregated asset index has positive effects on child 
education in both cases, I find no evidence of asset-specific effects on educational outcomes of 
urban children and children from livestock producers. Results for boys vs. girls, and poor vs. non-
poor sub-samples are not presented here, but I find evidence of differential effects in none of these 
cases. This indicates that while positive wealth effects on child education consistently holds in 
various scenarios, different types of assets have differential effects mostly among rural children and 
children from grain crop farmers. The results make a perfect sense in that the opportunity cost of 
schooling may not increase with agricultural assets if the household is not farming regardless of 
wealth status. In rural areas, labor markets are mostly absent and most households operate in 
agrarian settings so increased stock of agricultural assets increases opportunity cost of schooling.  
 
Effects of assets on exam performance 
 Results so far show that agricultural assets have negative effects on highest grade completed 
and the negative effects largely stem from child labor in agriculture because most agricultural assets 
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are complement to child labor. While the ‘highest grade completed’ provides a valid measurement of 
school enrollment and grade completion, it does not measure individual performance in specific 
exams. I use the PSLE ratio to examine the effects of assets on school-age children’s performance in 
the primary school leaving exam (Table 2.8) and FIVE ratio to assess the effects of assets on 
adolescent’s performance in the form IV exam (Table 2.9). I still use the framework in equation (2.7) 
and estimate the same two model specifications, one with aggregated asset index and another with 
dis-aggregated indexes, but this analysis is carried out at the household level. While the key variables 
of interest are still the same, the new set of control covariates excludes all individual level controls 
but includes other household level controls.9 Results from the first specifications are not presented 
here, but as expected, I find positive wealth effects on children’s performance in both PSLE and 
FIVE tests (See Appendix A Tables A3 and A4).  
Table 2.8 presents the estimated effects of asset holdings on the PLSE ratio, proportion of 
school-age children passing the PSLE exam. Results from the second specification, where the asset 
index is disaggregated to three sub-indexes, reveals that the positive wealth effect on PSLE 
performance mainly comes from household durables and housing quality assets. However, in 
contrast to the ‘highest grade completed’, PSLE performance is not affected by agricultural assets at 
all. Similar results hold for performance in the FIVE test as well; the aggregated wealth index has 
strong positive effect on FIVE ratio and the positive effect stems from effects of household 
durables and housing quality index but agricultural assets have no effect on adolescent’s 
performance in the FIVE test (Table 2.9). This implies that the effect of agricultural assets is not 
homogenous among children from the same household and may depend on children’s ability. To 
elaborate, children doing well in school may not be affected from agricultural assets as much 
                                                          
9 The new set of control variables include log(total expenditure), education of head, age of head, sex of head, 
marital status of head, household size, number of children, and binary indicators for residence in mainland or 
Zanzibar, and economic shock in the last 12 months.  
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because parents’ expected returns from sending high ability children to school may be higher than 
the expected return from investment on low ability children’s education. Because expected return 
from schooling is higher for high ability children (Akresh et al. 2012), opportunity cost of schooling 
for high ability children may be not as high as compared to children performing poorly in school. As 
a consequence, children who were not doing well in school may have had no opportunity to take the 
tests because they might have been taken out of school for farm activities. Since increased 
agricultural assets may incentivize parents to take out low ability children from school, agricultural 
assets adversely affect the highest grade completed but do not affect test performance because 
children taking the tests are mostly high ability students. 
Among other variables, household consumption expenditure has a strong positive effect on 
PSLE and FIVE ratios, suggesting positive income effect on child educational outcomes. Similarly, 
maximum parents’ education has a positive effect on both ratios. Parental education contributes to 
enhanced performances in both tests, but unlike the effects on ‘highest grade completed’, having a 
school in village has no effect on children’s performance on either test. An implication is that 
students who are doing well and still in school may find it worthwhile to travel to nearby community 
for schooling, but students who are not doing well may drop out when school is far away.  
 
2.6.3. Robustness check 
I run several alternative specifications for all three outcome variables – highest grade 
completed, PSLE ratio, and FIVE ratio – and the results are more or less consistent with my results 
from the main specifications. First, to avoid potential confounding effects of assets on child 
education through income, I exclude consumption expenditure variable from the model 
specification and estimate the effects of different types of assets. I find that excluding consumption 
expenditure from the model slightly attenuates the negative effects of agricultural assets (coefficient 
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estimate decreases from -0.013 to -0.014), but amplifies the positive effects of both household 
durables (0.026 to 0.036) and housing quality index (0.066 to 0.073). Similar pattern holds for both 
PSLE and FIVE ratios, no significant change in the effects of agricultural assets but strengthened 
positive effects of other assets. Second, to address the concern of potential endogeneity of 
household size variable, I run my preferred model specification (HTIV with expenditure variable 
included) specifying household size as time-varying endogenous variable. Results are consistent with 
the main results and the negative effect of household size remains the same leaving no evidence for 
positive effects of household size through so called ‘economies of scale’ effects. 
 
2.7. Conclusion   
 
A large body of empirical evidence indicates that household wealth helps improve child 
education (Deng et al. 2014; Chowa et al. 2013; Huang 2013; Huang 2011; Elliott et al. 2011; Kim 
and Sherraden 2011; Shanks 2007; Zhan and Sherraden 2003; Conley 2001). Despite the positive 
effect of household wealth, there is extremely limited empirical evidence on how different 
components of the wealth (i.e. different assets) contribute to child education after controlling for 
household income. In this paper I developed a simple theoretical model that explains how different 
types of assets can have differential effects on child education. My model predicts, when labor 
market is perfect, increase in assets contributes to child education, but when labor market is missing, 
the effect of assets depends on asset types and other conditions. Under the assumption of missing 
labor market, my empirical results confirmed the theoretical findings and revealed that different 
assets have differential effects on child education presumably through child labor.  
I showed that agricultural assets have adverse effect on the highest grade completed but have 
no effect on performance in the primary school leaving exam and the form IV exam. This implies 
that agricultural assets may increase the opportunity cost of schooling for children but the increment 
34 
 
may not be homogenous among siblings or other children in the same household. For children who 
are doing well in school, the opportunity cost of schooling is warranted because they have higher 
expected return from education than other children. As child schooling largely depends on parental 
decision about when and which child to send to school, parents may choose to take the low 
performing children out of school and invest more in ‘good’ children’s education. This is likely the 
case in many developing countries and it certainly leads to negative effect of agricultural assets on 
grade completed or school enrollment but no effect on school performance because children who 
are still in school are not affected by household’s endowment of agricultural assets. Evidence that 
agricultural assets have negative effects on child education because they represent labor using 
technologies and increase the opportunity cost of schooling is provided by the larger negative 
estimated effect of agricultural assets for children working in household agricultural activities than 
for other children. My finding that the negative effects of agricultural assets is amplified for rural 
children or children of crop producers also backs up the evidence that the negative effect of 
agricultural assets operates through child labor in agriculture. 
Household durable assets such as radio, TV, bicycle and housing quality assets such as better 
toilet facility, access to electricity, and good quality house have positive effects on both ‘grade 
completed’ and exam performance. Unlike agricultural assets, household durables and good quality 
housing are not labor using technology and they are unlikely to increase the opportunity cost of 
schooling. Instead, a large endowment of household durables and good housing conditions are 
perceived as household wealth or higher socioeconomic status that contribute to better education 
for children via wealth effect. In addition, these assets may provide enhanced economic security and 
reduced economic stress among parents which usually leads to better child education through good 
parenting. The positive effect of housing quality assets is a part of wealth effect on child education, 
but some assets such as access to electricity, safe drinking water, and good toilet facility may have a 
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direct effect on child education; electricity increases efficiency studying, and access to safe water and 
good toilet facilities may improve school performance through improved health of children.  
Results imply that even though assets serve as a good predictor of child educational 
performance, asset based interventions that capitalize in agricultural assets may not be favorable for 
child education. If child education is an intended goal of the intervention, transferring agricultural 
assets or other resources to build agricultural asset holding may not yield the desired result. Despite 
the potential negative effect of agricultural assets on child education, there may be ways to increase 
agricultural asset holdings without compromising child education. Since the negative effect of 
agricultural assets essentially boils down to child labor in agriculture, asset-based interventions 
conditional on ‘no child labor in agriculture’ policy may help increase household welfare without 
hurting child education; although implementing such a policy may be extremely difficult. Another 
implication of our findings is that transferring agricultural assets in combination with awareness 
training or adult education to parents, or establishing a public school in the target community also 
may help mitigate the potential adverse effects of agricultural assets on child education. 
Programs that help accumulate household durables or improve housing quality 
characteristics contribute to child education and therefore may be incorporated in policy 
interventions aiming to improve both household welfare and child education. Although policy 
interventions that transfer household durables or housing quality assets are rare in practice, empirical 
findings in this study suggest that interventions that combine agricultural asset transfers with 
household durables or housing quality assets may contribute to household socioeconomic status as 
well as temper the potential negative effect of agricultural assets on child education. Since I control 
for household income, my findings should still hold regardless of the level of household income. 
One caveat is that this study does not consider the threshold level of income or asset holding above 
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which change in asset ownership may have no effect on child education because demand for child 
education is inelastic to the opportunity cost of schooling.  
Overall, the key implication of this study is that assets are an important element of social 
policies that focus on improving both household and individual welfare. The traditional method of 
considering all assets under household’s possession as an aggregated measure of household wealth 
may be misleading because different type of assets have differential effects on child education and 
this may be true for other outcomes too. The evidence that, even after controlling for household 
income, asset holding has a significant positive effect on child education but the effect differs by the 
type of assets is a novel finding and deserves further exploration. If similar findings hold for other 
countries and contexts, it should help researchers and policymakers to design asset based 
interventions or other interventions that help accumulate assets in a more meaningful way.  
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2.8. Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Educational system in Tanzania 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Effects of exogenous increase in assets and income on child labor and household 
consumption 
 Perfect labor market No labor market 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
 l c l c l c l c 
Agricultural Assets (K)  - + - + ± + ± + 
         
Assets specific to child education (A) . . + - . . + - 
         
Income (y) - + - + - + - + 
         
Education production function (q) No Yes No Yes 
Notes. l indicates child labor, and c indicates household consumption. Similarly, -, +, and ±, indicate 
negative, positive, and ambiguous effects of assets or income, respectively, on child labor and 
household consumption. 
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics of individual and household characteristics 
Characteristics Wave 1 
(2008/09) 
Wave 2 
(2010/11) 
Wave 3 
(2012/13) 
Observations 
Individual     
Age 20.97 22.76 24.48 14552 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.144)  
Gender (1=male,0=female) 0.49 0.49 0.49 14552 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
Age started school† 8.01 8.01 8.01 9645 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  
Household      
Expenditure, real (million TSZ) 2.50 2.91 3.84 3069 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.062)  
Maximum parent’s education‡  2.23 2.23 2.23 3064 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)  
Household size 5.01 5.27 5.26 3073 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)  
Number of children 6-18 2.79 2.89 2.84 3073 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)  
Shock in last 12 months 
(1=Yes,0=No) 
0.53 0.41 0.36 3073 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
Rural 0.72 0.71 0.71 3069 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
School in village (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.89 0.94 0.96 3073 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)  
Household Head     
Age 45.3 47.1 48.7 3073 
 (0.28) (0.276) (0.27)  
Gender (1=Male, 0= Female) 0.76 0.75 0.74 3073 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
Education level (grade) 2.27 2.27 2.27 3073 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)  
Marital status (1= Married, 0 else) 0.75 0.74 0.72 3073 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
Notes. Point estimates are population weighted means. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
†Number of observations of ‘age started school’ is much smaller than other variables because about 
35 percent of the population has never attended school  
‡Maximum parent’s education is maximum education level of father or mother. It is coded as 
follows: 1= no education, 2= primary not finished, 3= primary, 4= secondary not finished, 5= 
secondary, and 6= higher than secondary.  
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 Table 2.3: Summary statistics of child educational outcomes across three waves 
Educational outcomes Wave 1 
(2008/09) 
Wave 2 
(2010/11) 
Wave 3 
(2012/13) 
Observations 
Highest grade completed 5.86 7.64 9.14 4112 
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.054)  
     
PSLE pass ratio‡ - 0.18 0.23 3101 
  (0.005) (0.006)  
     
FIVE pass ratio‡ - 0.10 0.13 2696 
  (0.005) (0.006)  
Notes. Point estimates are population weighted means. Standard errors are in the parentheses.   
‡Primary school leaving exam (PSLE) and Form IV exam (FIVE) are national level examinations 
administered after 7th and 11th grades, respectively. The PSLE and FIVE ratios are the proportions 
of children passing the PSLE and FIVE tests to total children of ages 6-18 and 16-24, respectively. 
Because test scores data are not available for the first wave, both PSLE and FIVE ratios are 
presented for the second and third waves only. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Summary statistics of asset indexes across three waves 
 
Asset indexes 
Wave 1 
(2008/09) 
Wave 2 
(2010/11) 
Wave 3 
(2012/13) 
Aggregated Asset index† -0.227 0.020 0.207 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.059) 
    
Household durable index -0.128 0.082 0.046 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) 
    
Agricultural asset index 0.067 0.025 -0.091 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.011) 
    
Housing quality index -0.155 -0.028 0.182 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) 
Observations 3082 3082 3082 
Notes. Point estimates are population weighted means. Standard errors are in the parentheses. All 
asset indexes are constructed using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and the same loading 
factors obtained from the pooled data are used across three waves. 
†Aggregated asset index consist of 59 variables, and three sub-indexes – household durable index, 
agricultural asset index, and housing quality index – consist 23, 22, and 14 variables, respectively.  
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Table 2.5. Effects of aggregated asset index on highest grade completed of children ages 6 to 18 
 Dep. variable: Highest grade completed 
 RE FE HTIV 
Log(Total expenditure) 0.263*** 0.152*** 0.164*** 
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.034) 
    
Aggregated Asset index 0.098*** 0.038** 0.051*** 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) 
    
School in village (1=Yes,0=No) 0.145** 0.239*** 0.248*** 
 (0.063) (0.086) (0.073) 
    
Max. parent's education 0.224*** - 0.843*** 
 (0.025)  (0.077) 
    
Gender (1=Male, 0=Female) -0.275*** - -0.293*** 
 (0.053)  (0.060) 
    
Head’s gender (1=Male, 0=Female) -0.229*** -0.289** -0.046 
 (0.076) (0.114) (0.056) 
    
Age (Years) 0.810*** 0.814*** 0.814*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) 
    
Age started school -0.463*** - -0.431*** 
 (0.025)  (0.024) 
    
Household size -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.074*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) 
Observations 11992 11992 11992 
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Results 
are based on panel of children who have attended school and were 6 to 18 years old in 2008. Results 
are presented for key variables only, estimated model includes additional variables. 
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Table 2.6. Effects of different assets on highest grade completed of children ages 6 to 18 
 Dep. variable: Highest grade completed 
 RE FE HTIV 
Log(Total expenditure) 0.241*** 0.146*** 0.157*** 
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.034) 
    
Household durable index 0.073*** 0.020 0.026* 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) 
    
Agricultural asset index -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
    
Housing quality index 0.096*** 0.053** 0.066*** 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) 
    
School in village (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.150** 0.242*** 0.248*** 
 (0.063) (0.086) (0.073) 
    
Max. parent's education 0.213*** - 0.827*** 
 (0.025)  (0.078) 
    
Gender (1=Male, 0=Female) -0.275*** - -0.292*** 
 (0.053)  (0.060) 
    
Head’s gender (1=Male, 0=Female) -0.243*** -0.287** -0.149** 
 (0.076) (0.114) (0.071) 
    
Age (Years) 0.810*** 0.811*** 0.812*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) 
    
Age started school -0.459*** - -0.429*** 
 (0.025)  (0.024) 
    
Household size -0.079*** -0.078*** -0.074*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) 
Observations 11992 11992 11992 
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Results 
are based on panel of children who have ever attended school and were 6 to 18 years old in 2008. 
Results are presented for key variables only, estimated model includes more variables. 
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Table 2.7. Effects of different assets on highest grade completed of children ages 6 to 18, under 
various scenarios 
 Model: HTIV 
 Rural Urban Grain crop 
farmers 
Livestock 
keepers 
Log(Total expenditure) 0.152*** 0.258*** 0.221*** 0.191*** 
 (0.040) (0.071) (0.040) (0.044) 
     
Household durable index 0.068*** 0.021 0.057*** 0.081*** 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) 
     
Agricultural asset index -0.026*** -0.007 -0.012* 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
     
Housing quality index 0.123*** 0.010 0.102*** 0.109*** 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.023) (0.026) 
     
School in village (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.241* 0.074 0.314*** 0.327*** 
 (0.134) (0.091) (0.101) (0.119) 
     
Max. parent's education 0.581*** 0.470** 0.837*** 0.759*** 
 (0.139) (0.192) (0.133) (0.145) 
     
Gender (1=Male, 0=Female) -0.313*** -0.185* -0.289*** -0.298*** 
 (0.065) (0.102) (0.065) (0.070) 
     
Head’s gender (1=Male, 0=Female) -0.224*** -0.065 -0.144* -0.075 
 (0.086) (0.128) (0.085) (0.096) 
     
Age (years) 0.764*** 0.902*** 0.782*** 0.792*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) 
     
Age started school -0.420*** -0.437*** -0.422*** -0.405*** 
 (0.031) (0.054) (0.030) (0.033) 
     
Household size -0.073*** -0.084*** -0.078*** -0.068*** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) 
Observations 8095 3897 8796 7217 
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Results 
are based on panel of children who have ever attended school and were 6 to 18 years old in 2008. 
Results are presented for key variables only, estimated model includes more variables. 
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Table 2.8. Effect of different assets on Primary School Leaving Exam (PSLE) performance of 
children ages 6 to 18 
 Dep. variable: PSLE pass ratio 
 RE FE HTIV 
Log(Total expenditure) 0.051*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
    
Household durable index 0.012*** 0.008* 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
    
Agri. asset index 0.001* 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
    
Housing quality index 0.018*** 0.003 0.010* 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
    
School in village 0.007 0.012 0.011 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) 
    
Max parent’s education 0.006 - 0.073*** 
 (0.005)  (0.019) 
    
Head: age 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Head: Gender (1=male, 0=female) -0.036*** -0.075*** -0.033** 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.014) 
    
Household size -0.024*** 0.002 -0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Observations 6029 6029 6029 
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. As the 
dependent variable is at the household level, no individual characteristics are included in the model. 
Results are presented for key variables only, estimated model includes more variables. 
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Table 2.9. Effect of different assets on Form IV Exam (FIVE) performance of youth ages 18 to 24 
 Dep. variable: FIVE pass ratio 
 RE FE HTIV 
Log(Total expenditure) 0.036*** 0.024*** 0.031*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
    
Household durable index 0.018*** 0.004 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
    
Agri. asset index -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
    
Housing quality index 0.019*** 0.009* 0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
    
School in village 0.008 0.007 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) 
    
Max parent’s education 0.011***  0.077*** 
 (0.004) - (0.019) 
    
Head: age 0.001*** 0.001 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Head: Gender (1=male, 0=female) -0.029** -0.033 -0.018 
 (0.013) (0.035) (0.013) 
    
Household size -0.010*** -0.000 -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 5219 5219 5219 
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. As the 
dependent variable is at the household level, no individual characteristics are included in the model. 
Results are presented for key variables only, estimated model includes more variables. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DOES 25 CENTS MORE PER DAY MAKE A DIFFERENCE? THE IMPACT OF 
LIVESTOCK TRANSFER AND DEVELOPMENT IN ZAMBIA.10 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Programs to transfer productive assets to poor households often intend to place recipients 
on a new trajectory of higher productivity and reduced vulnerability. In some rural settings, transfer 
of assets in the form of livestock may be a particularly effective mechanism toward this end as the 
introduction of animal production can contribute to income, improved diet, and greater food 
security at the individual, household, and community levels (Hoddinott and Yohannes 2002; Ruel 
2003; Sansoucy 1995; Randolph et al. 2007). Recently, a few empirical studies including Rawlins et al. 
(2014), Banerjee et al. (2015), and Jodlowski et al. (2016) have applied rigorous field experiments and 
found positive effects on food security and poverty indicators attributable to livestock transfers 
embedded in multifaceted programs. While these studies find statistically significant effects, it is not 
clear that the effects are sufficiently large to be considered transformative. Reported impacts on per 
capita consumption expenditures show increases of about US$0.25 per day or more, but absolute 
levels of per capita consumption remain near international poverty lines after the transfer. This study 
seeks to determine whether impacts of this scale affect the composition of consumption or 
subjective attitudes about poverty in ways that suggest meaningful change in welfare. 
Poverty status is often conceptualized with reference to expenditures needed to secure a 
minimum requirement of food and essential non-food goods and services (Ravallion 2015). 
Observing greater consumption of goods that are locally considered discretionary or luxury items 
                                                          
10 This chapter is co-authored with Alex Winter-Nelson and Peter Goldsmith and has been already published 
in Food Policy. The published version (Kafle, Winter-Nelson and Goldsmith 2016) slightly differs from this 
chapter as the former includes Independent households in the analysis. I would like to thank Alex Winter-
Nelson, Peter Goldsmith, Craig Gundersen, Kathy Baylis, and Hope Michelson for their feedback. 
Comments from participants of AAEA annual meeting, 2nd global food security conference, Mid-west 
development economics conference, and IPAD seminar at University of Illinois have improved the paper in 
many ways.  
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can therefore signal a substantive transition beyond poverty into greater economic security. I identify 
goods as luxuries or necessities based on income elasticities from my baseline sample and examine 
whether there are shifts in consumption toward luxuries which would signal a qualitative change in 
economic status despite low total expenditures. Similarly, I examine the change in composition of 
household diet to understand whether observed increases in household dietary diversity correspond 
to improved nutritional quality. Finally, I examine whether increased total expenditures and changes 
in the composition of diet and expenditure correspond to changes in self-perceived poverty and 
food security status. By looking for variation in these outcomes over three different species of 
livestock that are transferred (dairy cows, draft cattle, or meat goats) I observe the degree to which 
specific types of assets influence outcomes for recipients and others in their communities. 
As in Jodlowski et al. (2016) I use the rollout of a multifaceted asset transfer program 
administered by the NGO Heifer International to identify current and future recipients of livestock 
transfers. Identification of these two groups is the basis of a quasi-experimental approach to impact 
assessment in which future recipients are the comparison group for current recipients. Other recent 
work on the impact of asset transfers (Banerjee et al. 2015) uses similar field experiments to assess 
the impact of multifaceted asset transfer programs. Like other recent studies, this paper also uses the 
NGO’s program rollout to address the selection bias and endogeneity that undermined earlier work. 
In this paper I first validate the results of Jodlowski et al. (2016), finding that an increase in 
consumption expenditures of 20% to 30% (about US$0.25 per capita per day) can be attributed to 
the livestock transfers and capacity building program. Extending Jodlowski et al. (2016) and other 
studies, I then assess whether the increases in expenditures have been significant enough to 
qualitatively change consumption patterns. I find evidence of increased consumption of foods that 
can be considered luxury goods, suggesting qualitatively improved economic status among 
recipients. I further use subjective self-assessments of poverty and food security to confirm whether 
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an enhanced sense of economic security has emerged. The analysis includes a sample of households 
that had selected out of participation to indicate the degree to which selection bias could have 
influenced results had the general population been used as a comparison group, rather than the 
subset of future livestock recipients.  
This paper continues with background on the arguments and evidence concerning livestock 
transfers in developing countries. I then present my research methods, explaining both the structure 
of the field experiment and the econometric techniques applied in this impact assessment. This is 
followed by a presentation of results and conclusions. 
 
3.2. Background 
 
Livestock may represent a particularly strategic form of asset transfer. In developing 
countries, livestock provide nutrient-dense animal source foods (ASF) and a stable source of income 
through sales of milk, meat, manure, draft power or the animals themselves (Randolph et al. 2007; 
Murphy and Allen 2003). Moreover, livestock can serve as a store of wealth and as insurance that 
can be liquidated when needs arise (Sansoucy 1995; Hoddinott 2006; Alary, Corniaux and Gautier 
2011). Additionally, increased investment in livestock can diversify income sources, provide 
continuous employment for men and women, and can serve as an income source for households 
with very little or no land (Upton 2004).  
Livestock production may represent a pathway to help poor people move out of poverty by 
providing access to market opportunities, increasing income and improving a household's asset base 
(ILRI 2006; Randolph et al. 2007). Animal agriculture may also offer a positive spillover effect on 
the local community by increasing the availability of nutritious but perishable foods that might not 
be provided through external markets. As livestock development can affect the local food economy, 
it could be expected to have a disproportionately strong impact on food security compared to its 
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poverty effect. In addition to the direct provision of ASF, livestock can enhance crop productivity 
through supply of manure and draft power (Otte et al. 2012). While animal production can divert 
food crops into feed, livestock may also convert low value, unpalatable and even inedible materials 
into nutrient dense foods (Smith et al. 2013).  
Animal products such as milk, meat, and eggs contribute to enhanced food utilization 
through their nutrient density. Essential nutrients which are lacking in plant based foods are 
naturally more bioavailable in animal products (Smith et al. 2013). Six micronutrients that are critical 
for human physiology -calcium, vitamin A, B12, iron, zinc, and riboflavin- are primarily obtained 
from ASF. For example, 100 gm of beef is more than enough for the entire day of protein, vitamin 
B12 and zinc requirement (Murphy and Allen 2003). Adding a small amount of ASFs to staple based 
diets can contribute to food security by improving the quality of diet substantially (Murphy and 
Allen 2003). 
Despite the potential contributions of animal agriculture to development, the livestock 
sector is often neglected in development policy in Africa. Alary et al. (2011) argued that although 
some African countries consider livestock as an important sector, cereal crops have received far 
more attention in policy papers, empirical analysis, and policy initiatives. One reason for limited 
government commitment to livestock development could be the absence of rigorous analysis to 
quantitatively measure the contributions livestock make. 
In the Copperbelt Province of Zambia, ownership of livestock, aside from poultry, has been 
rare until recently. Despite the natural potential for crop and livestock production, previous reliance 
on mine employment had left little livestock development. In this context, Heifer International-
Zambia (HI-Zambia), has been sponsoring livestock donation with coordinated training to enhance 
both human and social capital. The core of the program is to transfer pregnant livestock to selected 
families who will pass on the first female offspring to other project families. The type of animal 
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transferred depends on the environmental and market context, as well as the capacities of the target 
families. HI-Zambia emphasizes a multifaceted approach that attempts to build the capacities of the 
individual families they support and of groups of families that embody social capital to provide 
services to the members after the formal close of the NGO program. Social capital is developed 
through a coordinated training on various social issues such as sharing and caring, self-help group 
formation, benefits of collective action, group self-reliance, and business management. Other 
support includes regular monitoring and evaluation, continued training, establishment of basic 
veterinary service providers, establishment of cooperatives, and intermediation with marketing 
agents. In addition, the requirement that beneficiaries ‘pass-on’ livestock and knowledge reinforces 
social capital for sustained impact.  
 
3.3. Research Methods 
3.3.1. Data 
This research took advantage of the rollout of a livestock donation program by HI-Zambia 
to establish a field experiment that enabled the measurement of treatment effects. As in Jodlowski et 
al, (2016) I use the rollout of asset transfers to identify current recipients of livestock and future 
recipients. Since both current and future recipients are subject to the same selection processes, I 
avoid problems of selection bias. Moreover, I am able to identify future recipients who are spatially 
and socially remote from the current recipients and those that are in close physical and social 
proximity which allows for identification of spillover effects.  
Prior to this research activity, HI-Zambia identified a number of farmer groups from 
communities in the Copperbelt Province which were eligible to receive livestock and associated 
services. However, limited resources dictated that only a subset of those farmer groups and 
communities would receive animals in the next few years. All groups selected for eventual support 
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were required to demonstrate appropriate membership with respect to households’ capacity and 
needs, cohesiveness of the group, and other eligibility criteria including a commitment to assemble 
appropriate equipment, construct animal sheds, and make other preparations. The screening implies 
that the poorest households are ineligible as they may not have resources to maintain the animals 
while non-poor households are excluded based on asset and income criteria. Since the members of 
all groups have self-selected to participate, I assume that they are similar to each other in terms of 
relevant non-observable factors, though they may not be typical of the population at large. 
Groups that are selected for inclusion receive support in a sequence that reflects the timing 
of their application. A queue is formed based on timing of application in order to determine rollout 
of support across the groups. Some eligible groups receive services in an initial round of donations 
and other groups, classified as “prospective”, must wait until resources are available for more 
donations. In this study, households from farmer groups in three communities that had been 
selected to receive livestock donations between November 2011 and January 2012 formed the 
treatment group for analysis. These groups represented all households in the program area receiving 
livestock transfers at the time of the baseline survey. In addition, households from two farmer 
groups from different communities in the same region that had been selected for future support 
were identified as “Prospectives”. These prospective groups were the next groups in line for 
services. As long as there are no systematic differences between groups based on timing of 
application, households in “prospective” groups can be used in an impact assessment as a control 
group for households that receive livestock in the initial distribution. This approach follows 
suggestions from De Janvry, Dustan and Sadoulet (2010) who note that staggered rollouts can be 
analyzed similarly to randomized control trials (RCTs) even when they lack explicit randomness.  
The second step in the selection process determined which households in the farmer groups 
selected for services in the first phase of the rollout would receive initial livestock transfers. While all 
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households in the groups receive training and the benefits of enhanced social capital, only a subset 
of them initially receive donated animals. The specific treatment groups identified through the HI-
Zambia rollout are summarized in Table 3.1. 
Households that receive animals in the initial distribution are identified as “Originals”. These 
households receive pregnant animals and are required to pass on the first female off-spring of those 
animals to other group members, identified as “Pass on the Gift” recipients or “POGs”. Key 
informant interviews with group members indicated that selection of original recipients was random, 
but the purity of that randomness is not known. The POGs, like the Prospectives, represent future 
adopters, but their proximity to the Originals implies that they may be subject to spillover effects as 
well as the benefits of training, neither of which are available to the households in prospective 
groups. Finally, the analysis identified a group of households in the communities receiving treatment 
that had chosen not to participate in the farmer groups. These independent households likely differ 
from the participating households in unobservable ways and are therefore unsuitable as a control 
group. I exclude the Independents from the analysis as they may be different from other groups in 
observable ways may contribute to estimation bias.  
Data were collected through four survey rounds administered every six months beginning in 
January 2012 and ending in August 2013. The baseline survey was administered to 324 households 
and a complete panel of four rounds exists for 300 households. Table 3.2 describes the baseline 
survey.  
Community 1 and Community 2 did not receive animals or services during the survey 
period. Households surveyed in the treated villages- Communities 3, 4, and 5- are either Originals, 
POGs, or Independents. In all cases pregnant animals were delivered and farmers received training 
well before animals were transferred. Based on the ecological and market conditions of the three 
villages, group members received either one pregnant dairy cow, two pregnant draft cattle, or seven 
52 
 
female meat goats. When cattle were distributed the groups received one bull to share as a group to 
service the females. A male goat was given to each goat recipient in addition to the seven females. 
The total value of the asset transfer was similar regardless of the species transferred. The baseline 
survey covered 106 Originals, 111 POGs, 67 Prospectives and 40 Independents. Attrition left a 
panel of 102 Originals, 100 POGs, 66 Prospectives, and 32 Independents. The attrition rate of the 
full sample is 3.1%, 3.7% and 4.9% in the second, third and fourth survey rounds, respectively. I 
find no obvious pattern in attrition. The Originals and Prospective groups have fairly low attrition 
rates, 3.8% and 1.5%, respectively compared to the POGs (10%) and the Independents (20%). 
Jodlowski et al (2016) presents a more complete analysis of attrition in this sample and finds no 
evidence of bias. As I exclude the Independents from the analysis, my full sample consists a panel of 
268 households.  
 
3.3.2. Difference-in-difference (DID) framework 
Taking advantage of the panel data available, I use the difference-in-difference (DID) 
method to measure the impact of the intervention. Combined with fixed effects estimation, the DID 
approach corrects for endogeneity that may arise from unobserved individual effects (Bertrand, 
Duflo and Mullainathan 2004). Within the DID framework I am able to accommodate the fixed 
effects model for normally distributed outcome variables, the poisson model for outcomes measured 
in count data, and the probit model for binary outcome variables. I use the DID method with 
household level fixed effects to estimate the effect of treatment on expenditures and revenues.11 As I 
have a panel of multiple treatment groups defined by species of animal received across four periods, 
                                                          
11 This method is similar to the approach used in Jodlowski et al (2016) but it differs from Jodlowski et al 
(2016) by considering POGs as a different treatment group rather than part of the comparison or control. 
These differences in specification were adopted because results from earlier study found evidence of a 
spillover effects in milk consumption on POGs which indicates that POGs would not be appropriately 
included in the control group when considering consumption of specific food items and food groups, which 
is the case in this study. 
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the empirical model (Equation 3.1) includes multiple dummy variables for time and treatment. 
Equation (3.1) is equivalent to the DID model specification for multiple time periods and multiple 
treatment groups suggested in Wooldridge (2010). I do not include dummy variables for the two 
treatment groups (Originals, and POGs) in this presentation as time invariant factors do not 
contribute to the fixed effects estimation. 
 
 
y
it
= α0+ ∑ βtRoundt
4
t=2
+ ∑ δtOriginalit
4
t=2
+ ∑ γ
t
POGit
4
t=2
+ ΠX + c𝑖+ εit  (3.1) 
 
 
In equation (3.1), i indicates the household and t = 2, 3, 4 represents the time period for survey 
rounds after the baseline. Thus, y
it
 is the outcome of interest for household i at time t, 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛dt is a 
time dummy variable equaling 1 for rounds 2, 3, or 4 and 0 otherwise, and 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎lit is the 
interaction of (𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛dt) and the full treatment (𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎li). 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎lit equals 1 for original 
households in round 2, 3, or 4 and 0 otherwise. Similarly, 𝑃𝑂Git is the interaction between time 
dummy (𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛dt) and the partial treatment (𝑃𝑂Gi). Similarly, βt is a time-varying effect; δt is a true 
program effect in that it is the difference in mean difference between original (treatment) and 
prospective (comparison) households; and γ
t
 is the combined effect of the program’s ‘Pass on the 
Gift’ initiative and spatial or social spillovers. Finally, c𝑖 is a household level fixed effect, X is a 
vector of control variables and Π is a matrix for estimated coefficients for elements of X. In this 
case, X includes gender and marital status of household head, and binary indicators for positive and 
negative shocks. Positive shocks include new job, business expansion, new source of income, or 
large gift in the last 6 months, and negative shocks include serious illness, theft or robbery, loss in 
business or job, natural disaster, crop failure, or loss of main income source in the last 6 months. 
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Equation (3.1) may be applicable when the outcome under study is represented with 
continuous data. This condition does not hold for all the variables of interest in this paper. The 
frequency of consumption of specific food items may reflect how people’s consumption behavior 
changes in response to asset transfer and is therefore of interest here. Consumption frequency is 
reported in the count of days with consumption per week and is estimated using a poisson 
regression. Since, estimating the poisson regression with the time-invariant individual effect leads to 
the incidental parameter problem,12 I combine the poisson model with the Chamberlin-Mundlak 
approach (Mundlak 1978). This correlated random effect approach allows the unobserved effect (c𝑖) 
to be correlated with the control variables, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 . I estimate the resulting equation (3.2) by Quasi-
Maximum Likelihood (QMLE) method and obtain a consistent estimate of the treatment effect, β
 
. 
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where the covariate vector X includes all control covariates, and ?̅? includes time constant mean of 
the control covariates. Control covariates include household size, number of children five or under, 
age, gender, and marital status of household head, number of sheep, number of pigs, and dummy 
variables for positive and negative shocks. In equation (3.2) estimation of the treatment effect on 
consumption frequency is carried out by regressing consumption frequency on dummy variables for 
treatment and time as well as control covariates, (xit) and their time constant averages (xi̅) with a 
constant included in the pooled poisson model. From equation (3.2), δt = log(μ1) - log(μo) and 
                                                          
12 Estimating a poisson fixed effects model resulted in loss of 221 observations because outcome variables 
which equal 0 across all time periods, ( 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0 ∀ 𝑡) did not contribute to the estimation. 
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exp(δt) =
μ
1
μ
0
. The incidence rate ratio, exp(δt), is interpreted as a count of times the change in the 
outcome variable differs between the treated and control groups. 
Subjective poverty outcomes are measured with binary response variables. Following 
Wooldridge (2010) and Mundlak (1978), I estimate the treatment effects on subjective outcomes 
using the pooled probit method.13 Thus, the correlated random effect approach presented in 
equation (3.2) is adopted for the probit model to estimate the impact on subjective poverty 
measures. In particular, I assume that the unobserved effect (c𝑖) is normally distributed and 
correlated with the control variables (x𝑖𝑡), i.e. 𝑐𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(𝛼 + 𝜃?̅?𝑖, 𝜎𝑢
2). The resulting equation below 
gives the consistent estimate of the treatment effect.  
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∣  𝑥𝑖𝑡 , ?̅?𝑖) = Φ(∑ βtRoundt
4
t=2
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4
t=2
+ ∑ γtPOGit
4
t=2
+ Π𝑋 + 𝜃?̅?)  (3.3) 
 
Similar to equation (3.2), I estimate equation (3.3) by pooling the data and regressing the outcome 
variable on dummy variables for treatment and time, xit, and ?̅?𝑖 with a constant included in the 
pooled probit model.  
 
3.3.3. Outcome variables 
Analyses of the impact of asset transfer programs often focus on consumption expenditures 
to gauge poverty impacts and dietary diversity to measure household food security effects (Banerjee 
et al. 2015, and Jodlowksi et al. 2016). After identifying an impact on expenditures poverty, I 
examine expenditures by consumption category considering food and non-food aggregates and also 
                                                          
13 The probit fixed effects model is not available and the logit fixed effects model is not appropriate. Under 
the logit fixed effect, observations with time invariant outcome i.e. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 ∀ 𝑡 do not contribute to the 
estimation of causal effect implying the loss of over 300 observations with the logit fixed effect. 
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considering specific food groups that represent staples and luxury food items in the local economy. 
Food expenditure includes the value of home produced foods that are consumed by the household 
economy. Increased consumption of luxury items can be taken as evidence that the treatment has 
led to a qualitative change in welfare, even if the absolute value of consumption remains low. 
Similarly, I estimate an impact on dietary diversity and then examine dietary composition. 
Dietary diversity is measured as the total count of food groups consumed at home in the past 24 
hours from a set of 13 possible groups, each containing multiple food items. My classification of 13 
food groups is consistent with FAO’s guidelines for household dietary diversity (Kennedy, Ballard 
and Dop 2011), but I merged ‘other vegetables’ with ‘green leafy vegetables’, ‘flesh meat’ with ‘organ 
meat’, and ‘beverages/spices’ with ‘sweets’ reducing the number of groups from 16 to 13. The 13 
food groups included are: cereals, white tuber, yellow/orange tuber, vegetables, orange/red flesh 
fruits, other fruits, meat/chicken, eggs, fish, legumes/nuts/seeds, milk and milk products, oils and 
fats, and sweets/beverages. I then examine the frequency of consumption of specific food items as 
another indicator of change in consumption mix and also to assess how any increase in dietary 
diversity corresponds to consumption of nutrient dense foods. Consumption frequency is measured 
as the number of days a household consumed food items from a particular food group over the last 
7 days. 
Increased expenditures on luxury items or increased frequency of consumption of such 
items is taken as evidence of a qualitative shift in economic status. Absence of such a shift would 
suggest that any increases in consumption expenditures have not been sufficiently large to alter 
beneficiaries’ sense of economic wellbeing or security. If the change in consumption has been 
sufficiently large to trigger a greater sense of economic wellbeing, I would expect subjective self-
assessment of poverty status to have changed. Therefore I examine whether changes in subjectively 
reported poverty status are consistent with observed changes in composition of consumption.  
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Various protocols for eliciting subjective assessments of welfare have been developed 
(Pradhan and Ravallion 2000; Gustafsson, Shi and Sato 2004). Although subjective measures 
themselves are difficult to validate, they provide a means to confirm whether perceptions of changes 
in economic status are consistent with the observed changes in consumption patterns (Ravallion 
2012; Carletto and Zezza 2006). One advantage of these measures is that they implicitly include the 
utility people receive from community-level or non-market goods, rather than just utility from 
private consumption. I constructed the subjective measure, 'Feeling Poor', combining two different 
poverty questions. The first question asks about self-sufficiency of the household and the second 
question assesses whether household circumstances are getting better over time. 'Feeling Poor' 
equals 0 if the respondent thinks the household always had at least enough resources to sustain itself 
or it is getting better over time. If the respondent thinks the household needs help or the situation is 
getting worse over time, then 'Feeling Poor' equals 1. 
Subjective measures of food security can also suggest whether a household’s status has been 
substantively changed by the asset transfer. There exist well developed methods for eliciting self-
perceived food security status such as the Household Food Insecurity and Access Scale developed 
by USAID's FANTA project (Headey and Ecker 2012). In this study, a household is classified as 
feeling food secure if the respondent chooses either of the first two responses from the question: 
“When you think about what you can feed your household, which of these best describes your 
situation? a) Always able to feed my family enough of the foods I want to give them, b) Always able 
to feed my family enough food, but not always the variety of foods I want to give them, c) Usually 
able to feed my family enough food, but not the variety I want to give them, and d) Usually unable 
to feed my family enough food or the variety I want to give them.” 
 
58 
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for outcome variables at the baseline. Salient features 
of the sample include, first, that households report very low consumption expenditures in the 
baseline, with mean expenditures levels in most groups well below the $1.25/day international 
poverty line.  Second, food insecurity appears prevalent in the sample, as a large share of 
expenditures is devoted to food for all groups, consumption of nutrient-dense ASF is rare, and the 
majority of households report that they do not feel food secure. The last two columns in Table 3.3 
present balance tests based on normalized differences (ND)14 between the Originals (treatment 
group) and Prospectives (control group) and between the Originals and POGs, respectively. Imbens 
and Wooldridge (2008) suggest that two groups can be considered different in observables when the 
value of normalized difference exceeds the threshold 0.25. 
Based on the normalized difference in baseline values (ND1), Prospective households 
appear to be slightly better off than the original recipients at the baseline in some dimensions but 
those differences should not affect the analysis as long as the explanatory variables are not 
qualitatively different. Other response variables such as livestock revenue, milk consumption days, 
meat consumption days, and dietary diversity are not significantly different between treated and 
control groups. Baseline dietary diversity scores are similar for all groups and all of them consume 
milk and meat products only about one day per week. Overall, treated and control groups look 
similar in the baseline survey. Similarly, all the values of normalized difference between the Original 
and POG groups (ND2) are well below the threshold level. Hence, the POGs and Originals also are 
                                                          
14Normalized differences (ND) are calculated as Δ𝑋 =  
𝑋1̅̅̅̅ −𝑋0̅̅̅̅
𝑆1
2+𝑆0
2 where ?̅?𝑖 and 𝑆𝑖
2 are sample mean and variance 
of covariates (X) for treated and control groups. This approach is preferred to the simple t-test because it 
does not vary with sample size. 
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similar in observable characteristics, supporting the information from key informant interviews that 
selection across these two groups was random.  
Table 3.4 summarizes characteristics of households, household heads, and assets in the 
baseline survey. In addition to confirming similarity across the treatment and comparison groups in 
the baseline, these data reveal the very limited use of livestock in farming systems prior to the 
intervention. Ownership of cattle and goats is very low among sample households at the baseline. 
The values of normalized differences in the fifth column of Table 3.4 indicate that the 
Original and Prospective groups are similar in all characteristics but household size. The difference 
in household size should not affect the analysis because household size is essentially time invariant 
for the period of my study and not included in the DID framework. The normalized differences in 
the last column of Table 3.4 indicate that the Originals and POGs are similar in all characteristics 
but age of the household head. I find no statistically significant differences in asset ownership in the 
baseline. 
 
3.4.2. Impact on consumption expenditure 
This analysis begins by estimating the impact of the program intervention on broad 
measures of poverty over time and across the species of animal transferred. In so doing I document 
the evolution of the impact at six month intervals and confirm the results of other analyses that used 
this data set. I then extend previous analysis by examining changes in the composition of 
consumption and in subjective assessments of wellbeing.  
Results concerning consumption expenditures and livestock revenue are presented in Table 
3.5. All outcome variables are log-transformed to smooth their distribution and results are obtained 
by estimating equation (3.1) with the fixed effects model. Results indicate that 18 months after the 
livestock distribution, receipt of an animal resulted in a 20% increase in total consumption 
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expenditures which implies an absolute increase of about US$0.20 per day per person. Six and 12 
months after the intervention the growth in consumption expenditure is 23% and 27%, respectively. 
In dollar values, these growth rates imply an absolute increase in per-capita expenditure from 
$.96/day at the baseline to $1.18/day after 6 months, $1.22/day after 12 months, and $1.15/day 
after 18 months. These results confirm Jodlowski et al. (2016) and Banerjee et al. (2015) in that the 
livestock transfer has a rapid, persistent, and statistically significant impact on consumption, but one 
that leaves initially impoverished households at low levels of absolute consumption.15 
Although all animal recipients have moved close to the absolute poverty threshold of 
$1.25/day, the measured impact still has left the households at a low level of consumption, well 
below the $2.00/day poverty line. Whether this increase has been sufficient to transform 
consumption patterns is examined below. As with total consumption, the impact of livestock 
transfer on the value of food consumption is positive, rapid, persistent, and statistically significant. 
After controlling for other factors, the growth in food expenditure (including the value of home 
produced foods and gifts) among the Originals is 24% after 6 months, 27% after 12 months and 
28% after 18 months. These impacts translate to an increase in per-capita daily food expenditure 
from $0.51 at the baseline to $0.65 after 18 months. The pattern of growth in livestock revenue 
suggests the mechanism through which livestock transfer increases consumption. All animal 
recipients generate income by selling animal products or services. 
The growth in livestock revenue came to about 200% over18 months. Daily per-capita 
livestock revenue increased from $0.07 at the baseline to $0.24 after 18 months of intervention. 
Despite the growth in income, there is negligible growth in non-food expenditure. This result may 
be partly driven by the large contribution of home produced animal source foods to consumption. 
But the failure to diversify increased income into non-food consumption raises questions about how 
                                                          
15 Results differ slightly from those reported in Jodlowski et al. (2016) primarily because Jodlowski et al. 
includes POGs in the control group. 
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transformative the asset transfer has been. Unlike the original recipients, the POG households show 
almost no impact on expenditure growth or livestock revenue.  
The POGs do show a statistically significant increase in the value of food consumption 18 
months after the intervention. This impact could reflect spillovers caused by changes in the local 
food economy due to the increased availability of milk locally. Dairy cow recipients reported selling 
about one liter of milk per day locally, while five to eight liters was sold daily into a national market 
through a collection center. Food consumption growth among the POGs may imply a difference in 
preferences among different groups or may reflect spillover effects that are social rather than purely 
spatial.  
Table 3.6 presents the effects on consumption expenditures by species. In this estimation the 
treatment periods are defined as baseline and post-treatment with post-treatment period consisting 
of all three follow up rounds. Treatment effects are therefore the average across the effects after six 
months, 12 months and 18 months. Results indicate that dairy cow recipients increase their total 
consumption expenditures by about 24% and the value of food consumption by 36% but experience 
no change in non-food expenditures. 
The average consumption expenditure growth in the goat recipients is about 20% with no 
impact on non-food expenditure. Those who received draft cattle had a 28% increase in total 
consumption expenditure and 42% increase in non-food expenditures but no change in the value of 
food consumption. Further calculations show that these changes translate to a growth in total 
expenditure from $0.98/day to $1.22/day among dairy cow recipients, $0.95/day to $1.15/day 
among goat recipients, and $0.95/day to $1.22/day among draft cattle recipients. Increase in the 
value of food consumption (including the value of home production that is consumed) for dairy cow 
and goat recipients but not for draft cattle recipients suggests that having the option for direct 
consumption of ASF affects the consumption pattern. The increased consumption of non-food 
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items by draft cattle recipients may signal a qualitative change in consumer behavior; it is not 
immediately clear whether such a change occurred for meat goat and dairy cow recipients. 
Unpacking the food expenditures into specific food items provides insight about the 
practical significance of the increases in the value of consumption identified above. Examination of 
specific patterns of consumption can suggest whether households achieve a level of economic 
security that allows them to diversify their consumption patterns or not. In particular, I can assess 
whether there has been an increase in consumption of items that are luxuries in the local setting, 
such as milk, meat, and rice which have income elasticities of demand of 2.4, 2.1, and 2.7, 
respectively. Maize and cereals, in contrast have estimated income elasticities of 0.7 and 0.9 and 
therefore are considered staples in the local settings. Further, the analysis can suggest whether the 
type of product produced by livestock (milk, meat or draft power) influences the consumption 
pattern of the owner. 
Table 3.7 presents expenditures for individual food items by species of animal received. As 
expected, dairy cow recipients increased the value of milk and milk products consumed dramatically 
(by 421% compared to Prospectives), but also increased consumption of sweets and beverages by 
91%. Growth in food expenditure among the draft cattle and goat recipients is explained by the 
growth in rice consumption, which is a local luxury food item and served as an occasional alternative 
to the primary staple, maize. Although the POGs had no growth in food expenditure in aggregate, 
they consumed significantly higher values of meat (88%) and milk (115%) products after the 
intervention. Results from my analysis of the impact over time are consistent with and do confirm 
this finding (Appendix B Table B1). The results imply that the local food environment has been 
changed after the intervention as households that did not receive animals are also changing the 
composition of their food expenditures. Program participants consuming more of rice and sweets 
and beverages along with animal products suggests that the mechanisms for changes in composition 
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of food expenditures have included market participation as well as direct consumption. Moreover, 
while growing expenditures on maize indicate greater consumption of the staple that could be 
consistent with persistent poverty, diversification of consumption into foods that represent luxury 
items in the local context signals substantive economic transition. 
 
3.4.3. Impact on diet 
Table 3.8 presents the impact of the intervention on dietary diversity and frequency of 
consumption of specific foods by animal species transferred. Results indicate that recipients diversify 
their diet by about one more food group per day (𝑒0.20 = 1.2). These impacts on aggregate dietary 
diversity are similar to those reported in Jodlowski et al (2016). To further understand the 
significance of this increase in dietary diversity, I estimate the impact of the program on the 
consumption frequency (days per week) of specific food groups using the model specified in 
equation (3.3). The estimated coefficients are log difference of expected consumption frequencies or 
simply a percentage change. As expected, milk consumption among the treated households has 
increased over time. Both ‘treated’ and ‘control’ groups increased milk consumption frequency by 
two to five days per week. Compared to the Prospectives, the dairy cow recipients consume milk 
and milk products about 5 (e1.58 = 4.9) more days per week. The meat goat and draft cattle 
recipients also increased milk and meat consumption frequency by about 2 more days per week 
compared to the Prospective group. The POGs also have a significant but smaller increase in milk 
consumption frequencies confirming the spillover effect shown in the expenditures data (Table 3.8).  
The results on milk consumption imply that animal recipients are consuming more milk 
because either they have new home production, or they now have enough income to buy milk, or 
milk has become more available in their community. Community level data show that milk has 
become more affordable as increased milk availability has driven down the local milk prices from 
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5000 kwacha per liter in the baseline to 3000 kwacha per liter in the final round. Over the 18 month 
period, the local milk price fell further in cow recipient villages to 2300 kwacha per liter. While the 
local market appears to be saturating with milk, the bulk of production is sold into the national 
market through collection centers where the price remained stable throughout the period. 
None but the goat recipients increased consumption of meat (2 more days per week) 
suggesting no evidence of income and price effects on meat consumption among other animal 
recipients. The intervention has no impact on the frequency of cereal or oil consumption, which 
were generally consumed daily in the baseline. Dairy cow and draft cattle recipients consumed 
sweets and beverages one more day per week as a result of treatment. This growth in non-nutritious 
food intake is much smaller than the growth in milk consumption, implying that the impact on 
dietary diversity is primarily from increased consumption of nutritious food items. The increase in 
ASF consumption may be a combination of both income and price effects. Because the POGs are 
consuming milk and meat more frequently, there is evidence of spillover effects in ASF 
consumption. I also run analysis over multiple periods considering all three animals as a single 
‘treatment’ and similar results hold (Appendix B Figure B1). Overall, the results indicate a gradual 
shift from staple foods to more luxury food items. 
 
3.4.4. Subjective assessment of poverty and food security 
Subjective measures of poverty and food security reinforce the impression that households 
who received animals have achieved a level of security despite their fairly low absolute consumption 
expenditures. Table 3.9 presents the impact on the subjective assessment of poverty and food 
security over time. Since the response variables (“Feeling Poor” and “Food Secure”) are binary, the 
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treatment effect on subjective measures is estimated with the pooled probit model.16 Results indicate 
that the predicted probability of “feeling poor” among the treated households has decreased over 
time. All animal recipients are less likely to feel poor after treatment but the POGs report no change 
relative to the Prospectives. Although dairy cow recipients are feeling less poor and more food 
secure, those who received goats or draft cattle report feeling that they are less poor but are 
indifferent about their food security status. Results suggest that even though all treated groups 
perceive themselves to be better off than the control groups do, draft cattle and meat goat recipients 
may be less affected than dairy cow recipients. It also suggests that the regular flow of milk from the 
dairy cows probably contributes to a feeling of food security. 
When the Independents are included in the analysis, the independent households claim to 
feel poor with increased frequency (Appendix B Table B2). The diminished sense of wellbeing 
among the Independents may reflect material changes not captured elsewhere in this analysis or a 
subjective feeling of dissatisfaction compared to the improved status of others in the community 
who have received asset transfers. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
Rigorous analyses have shown that multifaceted interventions blending asset transfers and 
other services can have statistically significant impacts on consumption expenditures among 
impoverished rural households (Jodlowski et. al., 2016; Bannerjee et. al., 2015). This paper explored 
the practical implications of those statistically significant effects by examining the impacts on the 
composition of consumption and subjective attitudes of program participants. In so doing I assess 
the behavioral and attitudinal impacts of the changes in expenditures. Taking advantage of 
                                                          
16 Full specification of the pooled probit model includes all time dummy variables, the following controls and 
their time averages. Controls: household size, kids age 5 or under, age of head, female head, married, number 
of sheep, pigs, chickens, positive shock, and negative shock. 
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differences in the forms of asset transfer (species of animal donated), the analysis provides insights 
into how specific types of assets may have divergent impacts on composition of consumption. 
Results indicate that livestock transfers to extremely poor households coupled with  
coordinated training on animal management and other themes can increase consumption 
expenditures, provide additional sources of income, improve dietary quality, and make people feel 
more prosperous and food secure. As a result of the program, the value of food consumption grew 
by as much as about 36% and total consumption expenditure by about 25%. However, the increases 
in expenditures that were observed left most households near or below the absolute poverty line, 
raising questions about the practical significance of the measured impacts. I find that observed 
changes in composition of food expenditures suggest that the treated households have achieved a 
new level of financial and food security, despite low absolute levels of consumption. The modest 
absolute change in expenditures (about 25 cents per person per day) has triggered a substantial 
qualitative change in the consumption mix and in perceptions of food security and poverty. Results 
indicate that livestock donation with complementary services can be an effective tool against hunger 
and poverty. 
Some of the changes in composition of consumption suggest ways in which transfers of 
livestock may have different effects from other asset transfers. Transfers of livestock that produce 
food encourage direct consumption of such foods, while transfer of other livestock assets (draft 
cattle) encourages non-food consumption by the beneficiaries. This result suggests an opportunity to 
skew expected consumption growth toward food if that were desirable from a policy perspective. 
Furthermore, growth in the value of milk consumption and in the frequency of milk consumption 
by the POG households who did not receive livestock donation suggests that the transfers have 
altered the local food markets in a way that implies community-wide benefits. While a cash transfer 
could have inflationary impacts on perishable, nutrient dense food items and thereby negatively 
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affect consumption among non-recipients, the transfer of livestock that produce such foods has the 
opposite effect. Against these potential benefits, transfer of specific assets like livestock implies 
higher costs of transfer and continued programmatic support and imposes rigidity in programs that 
could hamper effectiveness. Results suggest, however, that mastery of the details associated with 
transfers of specific assets can yield practically significant impact.  
The pattern of food expenditures growth raises some questions about measurement of 
impacts in practice and particularly the use of dietary diversity or cereal consumption as an outcome 
measure. Household dietary diversity measurement normally treats cereals as a food group, thereby 
pooling rice, maize and other grain consumption. In this case, increased access to food at the 
household level manifested itself in increased purchase of rice shifting the diet away from maize. 
This change marks enhanced household food security, but would not be captured in either a 
household dietary diversity score or in a “revealed preference” approach to food security presented 
in Jensen and Miller (2010) which considers declining share of expenditures to cereals as a marker of 
increased food security. In areas where large shares of the population consume a single staple crop, 
the scope and scale of substitution among cereals in the diet may have important implications for 
assessing the likely nutritional impact of income growth as well as identifying economic effects. The 
growth in consumption of sweets and beverages as a result of the program also raises concerns. That 
increased access to food manifests itself in greater consumption of bottled beverages and sweets 
presents a reminder that household food security may not necessarily translate into improved 
individual nutrition. The observed pattern of consumption may well reflect a larger problem of 
limited consumer options in rural communities. Low levels of market development in rural Africa 
mean that an incremental $0.25/day can be spent in very few ways in the local community. If the 
evolving patterns of consumption reflect limited range of consumer items available, the longer term 
impact of rising incomes may be to attract a broader array of consumer products into communities, 
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resulting in greater diversification of consumption. If this is the case, public investment to facilitate 
market development could be a key component to ensuring that any level of income growth allows 
consumers to exercise purchasing power effectively. Similarly, there may be scope for nutrition 
education and communication to promote diversification into more nutritious diets as income 
growth allows changes in composition of consumption. 
  
69 
 
3.6. Tables 
 
Table 3.1: Treatment and control groups 
Group Treatment Selection Services Location 
Originals  Full treatment Self-selected and 
screened for 
participation 
Receive services and 
pregnant livestock at 
baseline 
In treated 
communities 
     
POG Partial 
treatment 
Self-selected and 
screened for 
participation 
Receive immature 
animals 6 to 18 
months after baseline 
In treated 
communities 
     
Independents No treatment Self-selected out 
of participation 
Receive no services In treated 
communities 
     
Prospectives No treatment 
(control group) 
 
Self-selected and 
screened for 
participation 
Receive no services 
during period of 
analysis 
In non-treated 
communities 
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Table 3.2: Survey characteristics and attrition 
Panel A:   Treatment Status 
Community Species Total Originals POGs Independents† Prospectives 
1 None 31    31 
2 None 35    35 
3 Cow 83 31 40 12  
4 Goat 100 51 41 8  
5 Draft 51 20 19 12  
Total  300 102 100 32 66 
Panel B:       
Treatment Status Round1 Round4 Attrition (%) Panel Attrition (%) Attrition 
Originals 106 103 2.8 102 3.8 -4 
POGs 111 104 6.3 100 9.9 -11 
Independents 40 35 12.5 32 20 -8 
Prospectives 67 66 1.5 66 1.5 -1 
Total 324 308 4.9 300 7.4 -24 
Notes: Communities 1 and 2 are comparison groups for this study. These communities were selected 
for the program but they have not received the program yet. All other communities are treatment 
communities but not everyone in these communities received animals and training. 
†Independents are excluded from the analysis because they may be different from other groups in 
observable ways and contribute to estimation bias  
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Table 3.3: Summary of outcome variables in baseline 
Variable Originals POGs Prospectives ND1 ND2 
Total  expenditure ($/day) 0.96 0.93 1.37 -0.32 0.03 
 (0.695) (0.585) (0.957)   
      
Food expenditure ($/day) 0.51 0.52 0.72 -0.35 -0.03 
 (0.283) (0.386) (0.494)   
      
Livestock revenue ($/day) 0.07 0.12 0.032 -0.11 -0.07 
 (0.335) (0.582) (0.114)   
      
Household dietary diversity score 5.765 5.690 5.64 0.05 0.03 
 (1.862) (1.650) (1.935)   
      
Days milk served/week   1.32 1.01 1.64 -0.09 0.12 
 (2.13) (1.967) (2.647)   
      
Days meat served/week  1.01 1.19 1.23 -0.14 -0.11 
 (0.949) (1.426) (1.275)   
      
Feeling poor (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.63 0.75 0.86 -0.37 -0.18 
 (0.486) (0.435) (0.346)   
      
Food secure (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.37 0.39 0.38 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.486) (0.490) (0.489)   
Observations 102 100 66   
Notes: Point estimates are mean; Standard deviations are in parentheses. ND1 and ND2 are 
Normalize Differences between Originals and Prospectives and Originals and POGs, respectively. 
All monetary values are in $/day per-capita. The exchange rate used is 1 USD= 5,000 Kwacha. 
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Table 3.4: Summary of household characteristics in baseline 
Variable Originals POGs Prospectives ND1 ND2 
Household Size 7.40 7.08 5.67 0.45 0.08 
 (2.833) (2.809) (2.073)   
      
Number of children 5 or under 1.18 1.29 1 0.13 -0.08 
 (1.009) (0.935) (0.911)   
      
Number of children 6 to 16 2.40 2.56 1.79 0.27 -0.07 
 (1.643) (1.748) (1.398)   
Household head characteristics 
Age 50.53 43.54 45.12 0.27 0.37 
 (12.35) (12.37) (14.75)   
      
Education 2.90 3.10 2.91 -0.003 -0.09 
 (1.432) (1.570) (1.296)   
      
Gender (1=Female, 0=Male) 0.29 0.26 0.21 0.13 0.05 
 (0.458) (0.441) (0.412)   
      
Married (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.81 0.89 0.79 0.04 -0.15 
 (0.391) (0.314) (0.412)   
Household Assets      
Cultivated land (HA) 4.66 3.94 2.65 0.27 0.05 
 (6.545) (3.802) (2.921)   
      
Number of cattle  0.89 0.60 0.61 0.10 0.09 
 (2.320) (2.287) (1.528)   
      
Number of goats 0.92 1.60 1.24 -0.05 -0.10 
 (5.762) (3.370) (2.327)   
      
Number of sheep 0.25 0.48 0.045 0.15 -0.095 
 (1.347) (1.925) (0.369)   
      
Number of pigs 0.56 0.21 1.47 -0.08 0.17 
 (1.838) (0.967) (10.63)   
      
Own TV (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.48 0.38 0.39 0.12 0.14 
 (0.502) (0.488) (0.492)   
      
Own bicycle (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.86 0.82 0.86 -0.002 0.08 
 (0.346) (0.386) (0.346)   
Observations 102 100 66   
Notes: Point estimates are mean; Standard deviations are in parentheses. ND1 and ND2 are 
Normalize Differences between Originals and Prospectives and Originals and POGs, respectively. 
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Table 3.5: Impact on poverty measures over time 
  Expenditures   
 Total Food Non-food Livestock revenue 
Original2 0.226** 0.236** 0.175 2.417*** 
 (0.103) (0.116) (0.145) (0.662) 
     
Original3 0.266*** 0.274** 0.290** 2.485*** 
 (0.097) (0.116) (0.134) (0.727) 
     
Original4 0.199* 0.277** 0.029 1.790** 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.174) (0.768) 
     
POG2 0.022 0.081 -0.012 -0.195 
 (0.109) (0.125) (0.144) (0.517) 
     
POG3 0.076 0.074 0.142 -0.341 
 (0.099) (0.118) (0.140) (0.634) 
     
POG4 0.149 0.309** -0.092 -0.890 
 (0.122) (0.130) (0.174) (0.696) 
Observations 1072 1072 1072 1072 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, Level of significance: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Dependent variables are log of expenditures and livestock revenue. Both expenditures and revenue 
are in Kwacha per-capita per week. The full specification of the estimated model is: ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +
 ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑡𝑃𝑂𝐺𝑖𝑡 + Π𝑋 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
4
𝑡=2
4
𝑡=2
4
𝑡=2  where X= (dummy variables for 
female head, marital status, positive shock, negative shock) 
Originali, and POGi are ‘treatment’ dummies for i=2,3,4. For example, Original2 equals 1 for all 
Originals in the second survey round, and Orignal4 equals 1 for all Originals in the final round and 0 
otherwise. 
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Table 3.6: Impact on poverty measures by animal species 
  Expenditures   
Recipients Total Food Non-food Livestock revenue 
Dairy Cow 0.243** 0.365*** -0.075 7.021*** 
 (0.116) (0.117) (0.188) (0.651) 
     
Meat Goats 0.205** 0.223* 0.208 -0.432 
 (0.104) (0.121) (0.143) (0.682) 
     
Draft Cattle 0.276** 0.205 0.422** 1.672** 
 (0.124) (0.132) (0.196) (0.704) 
     
POG 0.082 0.155 0.012 -0.469 
 (0.090) (0.103) (0.124) (0.547) 
Observations 1072 1072 1072 1072 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, Level of significance: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Dependent variables are log of expenditures and livestock revenue. Both expenditures and revenue 
are in Kwacha per-capita per week. The full specification of the estimated model is: ln yit =  β0 +
 ∑ βtRoundt +  δ1Cow + δ2Goat +  δ3Draft + γPOG + ΠX + ci +  εit
4
t=2  . X is a vector of covariates, i.e. X= 
(dummy variables for female head, marital status, positive shock, negative shock) 
Cow, Goat, Draft, and POG are treatment dummy variables equal to 1 for the specific treatment in 
the follow-up rounds and zero otherwise (eg. Cow equals 1 for all cow recipients in all follow-up 
rounds and zero otherwise).  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7: Impact on various food expenditures by animal species 
Food expenditures 
Recipients Rice Meat Milk Oil Sweets/beverages Maize 
Dairy Cow 0.436 0.473 4.208*** 0.455 0.915** 1.119** 
 (0.928) (0.488) (0.761) (0.452) (0.411) (0.486) 
       
Meat Goat 1.242* 0.800 1.076 0.314 0.293 0.044 
 (0.657) (0.649) (0.654) (0.364) (0.262) (0.226) 
       
Draft Cattle 2.276*** 0.704 0.826 0.266 -0.115 0.187 
 (0.828) (0.723) (0.954) (0.393) (0.280) (0.258) 
       
POG 0.509 0.873* 1.150** 0.297 -0.024 0.650*** 
 (0.645) (0.481) (0.521) (0.281) (0.222) (0.247) 
Observations 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, Level of significance: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Dependent variables are log of food expenditures. All expenditures are in Kwacha per-capita per 
week.  
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Table 3.8: Impact on food security measures by species 
  Consumption Frequency 
 HHDDS Milk Meat Cereal Oil Sweets/Beverages 
Dairy Cow 0.200*** 1.578*** 0.040 -0.001 0.036 0.192*** 
 (0.047) (0.080) (0.107) (0.049) (0.050) (0.055) 
       
Meat Goat 0.004 0.684*** 0.345*** -0.001 -0.031 0.063 
 (0.043) (0.088) (0.086) (0.043) (0.045) (0.050) 
       
Draft Cattle 0.207*** 0.756*** -0.011 0.021 0.026 0.154** 
 (0.055) (0.105) (0.125) (0.057) (0.059) (0.065) 
       
POG 0.054 0.482*** 0.022 0.001 -0.014 0.029 
 (0.036) (0.080) (0.079) (0.036) (0.038) (0.043) 
Observations 1071 1071 1071 1071 1071 1071 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, Level of significance: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Dependent variable in the first column is household dietary diversity score (HHDS) and rest of the 
dependent variables are number of days a food item is consumed in last week (counts). Results are 
obtained from the pooled poisson regression.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.9: Impact on poverty and food security measures 
 Feeling poor Food secure 
Dairy Cow -1.349*** 0.582*** 
 (0.270) (0.169) 
   
Meat Goats -0.322** 0.062 
 (0.155) (0.149) 
   
Draft Cattle -0.663*** 0.178 
 (0.240) (0.197) 
   
POG 0.160 -0.099 
 (0.130) (0.128) 
Observations 1072 1072 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, Level of significance: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Both dependent variables are binary. Feeling poor equals 1 if people are feeling relatively worse and 
0 if feeling same or better. Food secure equals 1 if people feel food secured and 0 if they feel 
otherwise. Results are obtained from the pooled probit regression. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HIS, HERS, OR OURS: THE IMPACT OF LIVESTOCK TRANSFER AND TRAINING     
ON INTRA-HOUSEHOLD DECISION-MAKING IN ZAMBIA.17 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Women’s empowerment has received considerable attention among development 
practitioners and researchers in recent years. Empowering women – improving their economic and 
social status and enhancing their decision-making power within the household – is considered both 
to have intrinsic value and to serve as a means to other economic development objectives (Deere et 
al. 2013; Deere and Doss 2006; FAO 2011; Johnson et al. 2016; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2011). 
Numerous policies and interventions work to empower women through education, training, 
improved access to credit, leadership development, and transfer of economic resources. These 
programs tend to provide training to both men and women but focus on women for transfer of 
project-related assets and income (Banerjee et al. 2015; Das et al. 2013; Jodlowski et al. 2016; 
Johnson et al. 2016; Kafle et al. 2016; Rawlins et al. 2014). The design of these projects is motivated 
by evidence that improving women’s economic resources can alter the dynamics of intra-household 
decision-making. While research has focused on women's empowerment, empirical evidence 
regarding how such interventions impact men’s decision-making power is limited (Garikipati 2013). 
Successful household enterprises that are seeded through asset transfer may well benefit from some 
degree of male support or active involvement. Thus, a negative effect of the transfer on men’s 
engagement in decision-making could be detrimental to sustained impact. Some argue that 
                                                          
17 This research was made possible by a grant from Elanco Animal Health (USA), and by the cooperation of 
Heifer International. I am especially grateful to Kevin Watkins (Elanco), James Kasongo (Heifer 
International), Joyce Phiri (Heifer International), Djondoh Sikalongwe (Heifer International), and Peter 
Goldsmith (University of Illinois).  
I would like to thank Alex Winter-Nelson, Hope Michelson, Kathy Baylis, Craig Gundersen, and Dean 
Jolliffe for their inputs in earlier versions. This paper also benefitted from comments from participants of the 
Women’s Empowerment and International Development (WEID) and the International Policy and 
Development (IPAD) seminars at University of Illinois. Views, opinions and remaining errors are mine. 
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empowerment is a zero-sum-game and improving women's position disempowers men (Hanstad 
2014; Miller 2011) while others believe that empowerment can be a positive-sum game. Whether 
women can experience increased empowerment without disempowering men could be a critical 
question for multifaceted asset transfer programs, but empirical evidence to evaluate whether 
empowerment effects are zero-sum or not remains scarce. 
Whether and how a multifaceted asset transfer program affects household decision-making 
has consequence for the overall wellbeing of program participants in multiple dimensions. Empirical 
evidence strongly supports the claim that increasing women’s decision-making power can improve 
children’s health and nutritional outcomes and have other desirable welfare effects(Deere et al. 2013; 
Duflo 2012; Malapit et al. 2013; Sharaunga et al. 2015; Wilcox et al. 2015). As a result, asset transfer 
programs often concentrate on women and include women’s empowerment as an objective. But, 
excluding men from such multifaceted programs may make it difficult to fully realize women’s 
empowerment if men respond by withdrawing or withholding their support from women-led 
enterprises (Chant and Gutmann 2000). For example, successful implementation of a livestock 
transfer may require an allocation of adult labor and management within the household that can 
most easily be achieved with men’s cooperation. In an extreme, there is evidence that the 
disempowerment of men can be associated with sexually aggressive behaviors (Silberschmidt 2001) 
and increased incidence of domestic violence (Schuler, Bates and Islam 2008; Vyas and Watts 2009).  
A shift from individual to collective or joint decision-making could allow a household to 
reconcile an expanded scope of decision-making for women with continued participation by men. 
Aside from facilitating access to the physical resources of both men and women, collective decision-
making could be superior to individual decision-making due to the expanded information available 
when multiple parties are involved. Thus, there could be a benefit to expanding women’s and men’s 
shared engagement in decision-making. In the context of an asset transfer program, changes in 
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decision-making dynamics could emerge at the extensive margin, affecting only those new 
management decisions that arise as a result of the asset transfer (eg. where to sell the milk produced 
by the transferred dairy cow) or might permeate pre-existing decision spheres. 
In this analysis I consider a multifaceted program that combines training in multiple areas, 
including gender awareness, with livestock transfers. This program could affect women’s 
empowerment either through its focus on women as recipient of the transfers or through the 
training. The livestock that are transferred place a high demand on labor and management, making it 
likely that male engagement is beneficial to success. I assess (1) whether the program affected the 
pattern of decision-making in the beneficiary households, (2) whether joint decision-making 
emerged and the consequent implications for the scope of male and female influence on decisions, 
and (3) whether changes in decision-making were confined to the extensive margin of new decisions 
related to the transfer or permeated pre-existing decision domains. Understanding the impact on 
joint decisions is of particular interest as there is reason to suspect that engagement of men and 
women could be important for program success. Understanding whether a program affects decision 
dynamics beyond areas directly related to the asset transfer can suggest the breadth of impact that 
transfer programs have. 
Consistent with recent literature, I use decision-making within the household as a measure of 
empowerment (de Brauw et al. 2014; Doss 2013; Wiig 2013). Attempts to measure female 
empowerment through decision-making confront the need to weight joint decisions in which men 
and women both participate. As in the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI), I 
present measures in which women’s participation in a joint decision signals as much empowerment 
as women making decisions independently. I present analogous measures that gauge decision 
making processes only through changes in the prevalence of independent decisions for men or 
women and through changes in the prevalence of joint decisions. 
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This paper makes three primary contributions to the literature. First, my analysis is an early 
attempt to evaluate the impact of a multifaceted intervention – physical asset transfers and training – 
on women’s empowerment. I construct empowerment measures based on women’s control and 
authority over eight different decision spheres of household activities and identify causal 
relationships between the ‘livestock transfer and training’ intervention and women’s empowerment. 
The eight spheres include decisions about sending children to school, slaughtering animals, live 
animal sales, animal product sales, crop produce sales, control over farm income, access to 
loan/credit opportunities, and crop storage/sales. Within these spheres I measure 42 household 
decisions and treat all decisions directly related to the intervention (1. Cattle and goat sale and 
slaughter, 2. Milk, meat, and draft power sale, and 3. Access to loan/credit) as 'treatment-related' 
decisions. I use remaining decisions to test for spillovers into other spheres of non-livestock related 
household activities. I find an increase in women’s decision-making power, limited to areas directly 
related to the transfer. Second, I extend the literature by assessing men’s decision-making power and 
demonstrate that an increase in women’s empowerment need not imply reduction in men's decision-
making power in the household. This result emerges because of an increase in the prevalence of 
joint decision-making in the household. Third, because I am able to identify households that 
received training related to gender and household decision-making but had not received asset 
transfers, I can assess the relative impact of training with and without the transfer. The households 
that received training but no asset transfer showed no change in decision-making dynamics. My 
findings imply that there may be an essential complementarity between gender awareness training 
and providing asset transfers; the economic resource transfer leads to an increase in joint-decision 
making that is not observed in households that receive gender awareness training but not asset 
transfer. Moreover, the findings suggest that decision-making is more malleable on the extensive 
margin than in areas where decision dynamics are well-established. Methodologically, this analysis 
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demonstrates the importance of aggregating and analyzing joint and solitary decisions separately in 
empowerment studies and measures in order to capture the dynamics of intra-household decision-
making. 
My finding that most changes in decision-making are on the extensive margin may reflect 
two features of my sample. First, the number of decisions being made in the household is small in 
the baseline because of a lack of economic diversification. Of the 42 decisions that I can measure 
using the survey instrument I use, households on average report activity in 5 decisions in baseline 
and 10 decisions in endline. Second, in my sample the majority of decisions that I observe are made 
jointly at baseline. Combined these factors may drive the majority of project impacts to the extensive 
margin, introducing new decisions into the household. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, I discuss approaches to measure 
women’s empowerment and present a brief survey of the empirical evidence regarding the impacts 
of a range of interventions on intra-household decision-making or women’s empowerment. I then 
present the research methods, explaining both the structure of the survey and my econometric 
techniques. I present results and contextualize these results in existing theories of intra-household 
bargaining models. I discuss implications of the findings in the conclusion. 
 
4.2. Background 
Economic development and women's empowerment are critical complements (Duflo 2012; 
Malhotra and Schuler 2005; Mehra 1997). Empirical evidence suggests that more empowered 
women contribute more to household wellbeing and food security (Sharaunga et al., 2015; Wilcox et 
al., 2015), have healthier children (Doss, 2013; Lundberg, Pollak, & Wales, 1997), have fewer 
children and lower rates of child mortality (Dyson and Moore 1983; Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982), 
and contribute to improved household nutrition and dietary quality (Malapit et al. 2013). In addition, 
households with more empowered women enjoy greater resource allocation to children and children 
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from empowered mothers are likely to have better educational outcomes (Bruce et al. 1995; 
Garikipati 2013; Luz and Agadjanian 2015). Despite research establishing the importance of 
women’s empowerment for overall economic development, empirical evidence of the impact of 
policy interventions on women's empowerment is not definitive. Das et al. (2013) assesses the 
impact of a multifaceted intervention in Bangladesh that transfers physical assets, primarily livestock, 
and provides training to rural women and finds ambiguous effects on women's empowerment. 
Despite the fact that beneficiary women had ownership of the transferred assets, men retained 
control over other household assets, investments, and income generated from the transferred assets. 
Numerous studies have examined the impact of micro-credit, conditional cash transfers, or 
'training and education' on women's empowerment. Garikipati (2013) reviews existing literature on 
the relationship between microcredit interventions and women’s empowerment and finds mixed 
evidence; while some studies find a positive impact, others find neutral or even negative impacts. 
For example, while (Bandiera et al., 2014; de Brauw, Gilligan, Hoddinott, & Roy, 2014; Hashemi, 
Schuler, & Riley, 1996) find microcredit interventions to have positive impacts on women’s 
empowerment, Yoong, Rabinovich, & Diepeveen (2012) and Pitt, Khandker, & Cartwright (2006) 
argue that recipient’s gender affects the outcome. Pitt et al. (2006) takes a unique approach to test 
the difference in the impact of similar micro-credit programs targeting women versus men. When 
women were the primary recipients, the micro-credit program improved women's empowerment but 
the opposite result emerged when men were the primary recipients. In a systematic review of related 
literature, Yoong et al. (2012) notes that transferring resources to women does not guarantee 
improvement in women's empowerment because men generally control the majority of household 
assets and income. While the evidence of effects of asset transfers and micro-finance on women’s 
empowerment is mixed, studies of women’s education (Bandiera et al., 2014; Kandpal, Baylis, & 
Arends-Kuenning (2012), and conditional cash transfers (de Brauw et al., 2014) find more 
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consistently positive effects. The literature, however, is mostly silent about the impact of these 
interventions on men’s decision-making roles and responsibilities in the household and on the 
impact of transfers on joint decision-making. 
A large body of literature has established that women’s empowerment depends on existing 
gender relations (Garikipati 2013; Sraboni et al. 2014), reflects women’s control over resources 
(Behrman 2010), and access to education, income, and assets (Doss, 2013; Garikipati, 2013; Johnson 
et al., 2016), yet little consensus exists regarding the measurement of empowerment. The choice of 
empowerment measures in a given study tends to be dictated by data availability, research questions, 
and cultural or geographical contexts. Common measures of women’s empowerment include 
women’s decision-making power (de Brauw et al., 2014; Doss, 2013; Hou & Ma, 2013; Wiig, 2013), a 
multidimensional index based on women’s participation in social and economic activities (Bandiera 
et al., 2014; Bandiera & Natraj, 2013; Lépine & Strobl, 2013; Hashemi et al., 1996), women’s access 
to employment and physical mobility (Kandpal, Baylis and Arends-Kuenning 2012), women’s 
empowerment in agriculture index (WEAI) (Alkire et al. 2013; Malapit et al. 2013; Sharaunga et al. 
2015), women’s time use data (Garikipati 2012), and women’s entrepreneurial index (Bandiera & 
Natraj, 2013). Garikipati (2012) argues that women’s time use data can measure women’s 
empowerment because policy interventions that contribute to women’s welfare also affect women’s 
time allocation. Bandiera et al. (2014) takes a different approach, defining women’s empowerment as 
the number of times a respondent provides an affirmative answer to questions on women’s 
economic and social status. Hou and Ma (2013) create a composite index from eight different 
dimensions of empowerment – physical mobility, economic security, purchase ability, ability to make 
large decisions, relative freedom from family, and political awareness – and argues that a positive 
score on either any individual dimension or the composite index indicates empowerment. Unlike 
other studies, Wiig (2013) interviews both men and women using the same survey instrument and 
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calculates an empowerment index consisting four domains and 26 specific decisions. Wiig's 
methodology assigns equal weight to both joint and sole decisions and women’s empowerment 
considers decision-making power of the primary woman only. 
Despite methodological differences, most empowerment measures reflect women’s 
bargaining power, role in decision-making, and control over household resources and income. The 
WEAI is a comprehensive tool that brings together most of these attributes to measure women’s 
empowerment in agrarian settings (Alkire et al. 2013; Malapit et al. 2013). It combines five 
dimensions of empowerment – production, resources, income, leadership, and time allocation – in a 
complex methodology and assigns arbitrary weights to the five dimensions. It also includes several 
indicators that are difficult to measure and interpret, such as speaking in public and autonomy in 
production (see Alkire et al. 2013). My measure of empowerment is based on a subset of the 
dimensions of the WEAI focusing on decision-making but considered separately rather than 
aggregated into a single index. I concentrate on the first two dimensions of the WEAI, production 
decisions and control over economic resources, because I want to understand how the livestock 
intervention affects women’s decision making power on production activities and access to 
economic resources. I expect that production activities and control over economic resources are the 
two domains most likely to be affected by physical asset transfers and associated training. As in Wiig 
(2013) and in the WEAI, I quantify empowerment based on a count of decisions that an individual 
makes either independently or jointly with another person. 
 
4.3. Data and Methods  
 
4.3.1. Project Description 
 
This study uses the implementation of a multifaceted asset transfer program by the NGO 
Heifer International in the Copperbelt Province of Zambia to construct a field experiment to 
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measure empowerment impacts. The program was initiated in 2011 in 12 communities and involves 
provision of donated livestock, training and social capital development to households that belong to 
organized groups. Groups applied to Heifer Zambia for the opportunity to participate. The self-help 
groups that applied to Heifer Zambia were typically women’s groups at the time of application, but 
the screening process of the NGO favored groups that include participation of male and female 
household members when both sexes are present in the household. Thus, most groups were 
organized and led by women but included male participation. Selected groups received support and 
training over the course of a year, whereupon livestock were transferred to a subset of group 
members. Based on the ecological and market conditions, group members received either one 
pregnant dairy cow, or two pregnant draft cattle, or seven female meat goats and one male goat. 
Cattle recipients also received one bull to share as a group to service the cows. The total value of the 
asset transfer was similar regardless of the species transferred. The program requires that individuals 
receiving a donated animal pass on the first female offspring of that animal to group members who 
did not receive a gift in the initial distribution. Eventually, all group members are expected to receive 
animal asset transfers. The training component of the project includes training on gender balance, 
accountability, shared responsibilities, sustainability and self-reliance, social justice, environmental 
sustainability, improved animal management, and nutrition. Both men and women from recipient 
households receive the same training. 
The Heifer program emphasizes women’s empowerment in at least three ways. First 
women’s empowerment could be enhanced through capacity building in groups that have significant 
female leadership. Second the training component of the program stresses the benefits of collective 
decision-making, cooperation, mutual respect, and the importance of women’s contributions in 
household production. Finally, the assets that are transferred are formally given to women or to 
couples in almost all cases. Thus they are expected to increase women’s resources. 
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4.3.2. Sample Selection 
The number of groups that applied to Heifer Zambia for support exceeded the number that 
could be supported by the resources available in 2011. The research leveraged the phase-in design of 
the intervention to define a control group for the analysis. After the eligible groups were identified, 
livestock transfers were scheduled by order of application within the geographic scope of the 
project. Twelve groups were identified for transfers and training in the initial round. Groups from 
three communities were selected for study representing each of the three livestock types transferred. 
Additionally, eligible groups in two communities that were next in queue for future participation 
were selected to form a comparison group for the treated households. Households in these 
comparison communities had received nothing from Heifer after three years, but were considered 
eligible. 
Eligible groups that were ahead in a queue and received services in an initial round of 
distributions and are classified as “Early recipients”. Other eligible groups not selected as early 
recipients are classified as “Prospectives” and were deferred from receiving services until additional 
resources become available. Since all group members have self-selected to participate, I assume that 
they are similar in terms of relevant non-observable factors. They are also similar in terms of the 
observables that the NGO considers when selecting groups for participation. These observable 
factors include: appropriate membership in terms of household capacity and needs, cohesiveness of 
the group, and commitment to contribute to livestock insurance fund managed by the group and 
make complementary investments in sheds and fencing for livestock. As long as there are no 
systematic differences between groups based on timing of application, households in the 
“Prospectives” groups can form a control group for the “Early Recipients”. 
 Within the “Early Recipients” groups, all households received training and the benefits of 
enhanced social capital, but only a subset initially received animals. I designate those who received 
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assets in the initial distribution as “Original” recipients, while other households who received the 
offspring from the original livestock are labeled “Pass on the Gift” (POG) recipients. Figure 4.1 
details the selection procedure. Key informant interviews with group members indicated that 
selection of original recipients within the group was random, but the purity of that randomness is 
not known. The POGs receive second generation animals from Original recipients and majority of 
POGs had already received animals by the endline survey for this study (January 2015). The spatial 
proximity of the POGs to the Originals implies that they may be subject to spillover effects as well 
as the benefits of training; neither spillovers nor training are relevant for the Prospectives who serve 
as a control because they are geographically separated from the communities where Originals and 
POGs live and because they had not received the training by the project endline survey. For 
convenience, I refer to the Originals and POGs jointly as the “treated” groups and Prospectives as 
the “control” group18. 
 
4.3.3. Data 
Data collection included an initial survey in January 2012, at approximately the time when 
livestock transfers were being made to Original recipients (Initial livestock distribution extended 
from November 2011 through March 2012). Five additional rounds were conducted in July 2012, 
January 2013, July 2013, January 2015, and July 2015. This study uses a two-period panel because 
women’s empowerment questions were administered in two survey rounds only. Figure 4.2 outlines 
the survey timeline and corresponding sample sizes. The baseline for this study is the first follow up 
survey (July 2012), conducted four to six months after the initial animal distribution, and the endline 
for this study is the fourth follow up survey conducted in January 2015. Using the first follow up 
                                                          
18 A group of 30 households who were not members of any group and therefore ineligible for participation 
were also surveyed. These ‘Independent’ households are not included in this analysis due to concerns over 
sample selection bias. 
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survey as baseline should not make a qualitative difference because empowerment is a long run 
outcome and I do not expect empowerment or other factors in the analysis to change substantially 
in the program’s first six months. Note that if the program did contribute to women’s 
empowerment in the first six months, using the first follow up survey as baseline will underestimate 
the treatment effect. 
Table 4.1 presents survey characteristics and attrition rates. The baseline includes 276 
households of which 260 households were successfully re-interviewed in the endline giving us a two-
period panel of 260 households. The full sample attrition rate is about 6% but POGs have a slightly 
higher attrition rate of 8% while attrition among the Prospective households was 3%. I found no 
obvious pattern in attrition related to observable characteristics of the households. The structure of 
the livestock transfer and training intervention and availability of longitudinal data on men’s and 
women’s control over intra-household decisions lead to four testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. The asset transfer and training intervention expands women’s decision-making power.  
Hypothesis 2. The intervention improves women’s decision-making power in activities related to the 
transferred assets only, with no spillover into other decision spheres.  
Hypothesis 3. As a result of training and asset transfers, both men’s and women’s decision-making scope 
improves as they move from solitary decisions to joint decisions. 
Hypothesis 4. Effects of the intervention on decision-making are not observed among households that do not 
receive asset transfers in the initial distribution.  
 
4.3.4. Empowerment measures 
I specify two types of empowerment measures – decision scores and an empowerment 
index. I calculate decision scores for five different types of decisions – men’s and women’s joint 
decisions, men’s independent decisions, women’s independent decisions, men’s independent and 
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joint decisions combined, and finally, women’s independent and joint decisions combined. First, I 
use a decision score that measures decision-making power based on men’s and women’s 
independent and joint participation in decision-making, essentially giving equal weight to joint and 
independent decisions in the empowerment measure. The score based on the combination of joint 
decisions and women’s independent decisions is consistent with the approach of the WEAI. I use 
the decision scores that calculate the prevalence of uniquely male, female and joint decisions in the 
household to reveal changes in the decision dynamics between independent and joint decisions. All 
five scores can be applied to specific decision domains to determine if impacts differ between the 
domains closely related to the transferred asset and those that are not. These scores give equal 
weight to each of the eight decision domains I consider. As a robustness check I estimate weights 
from a principal components analysis and calculate an empowerment index to compare to the 
empowerment scores. Both the index and the scores can be applied to the Originals and the POGs 
separately to determine whether the asset transfer is essential to observing the empowerment effect. 
To construct the decision scores, first I calculate the proportion of independent and joint 
decisions made by male and female members of the household for each of the 8 decision spheres. 
Then, a decision score is computed by taking an arithmetic average over all decision spheres the 
household has reported some activity. Since there are only a few households with activities on all 8 
decision spheres, decision scores for most households are average over fewer than 8 decision 
spheres. Suppose T denotes the total number of decisions made in the household, Ti denotes the 
number of decisions under each activity domain i, Wi denotes the number of decisions under 
domain i made by female members, Mi denotes the number of decisions under domain i made by 
male members, and Ji denotes the number of joint decisions under domain i. Let 𝑁𝑘 be the number 
of decision spheres in which household k has reported some activity. Then decision scores for 
household k are computed as follows:  
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1. Female and joint score (𝑊𝐽𝑘) =
1
𝑁𝑘
∑
𝑊𝑖+𝐽𝑖
𝑇𝑖
𝑖   
2. Male and joint score (𝑀𝐽𝑘) =
1
𝑁𝑘
∑
𝑀𝑖+𝐽𝑖
𝑇𝑖
𝑖   
3. Joint score (𝐽𝑘) =
1
𝑁𝑘
∑
𝐽𝑖
𝑇𝑖
𝑖   
4. Female only score (𝑊𝑘) =
1
𝑁𝑘
∑
𝑊𝑖
𝑇𝑖
𝑖   
5. Male only score (𝑀𝐾) =
1
𝑁𝑘
∑
𝑀𝑖
𝑇𝑖
𝑖   
By construction, all five scores lie in the continuum from 0 to 1. The decision scores assign 
equal weight to each of the eight decision domains. Where there are more decisions in a given 
domain, each decision receives less weight in the score. Conversely, decisions that have more impact 
on the outcomes in a domain receive greater weight. The Female (Male) and Joint score can be 
interpreted as the mean over the domains of the share of decisions in which the women (men) 
participated. The Female (Male) Only score is the mean of the share of decisions over each domain 
in which the woman (man) had independent control. 
Changes in the Female and Joint Score and the Male and Joint Score will indicate changes in 
the scope of participation in decision-making, but will not reveal shifts from individual to joint 
decision-making. I use the Joint score and the Male only and Female only scores to test the effect of 
the asset transfer and training on participation in the share of independent and joint decisions 
(Hypothesis 3). I test whether joint decisions increase significantly and independent decisions 
decrease at the same time. 
As a validity check of decision scores, I calculate five empowerment indexes analogous to 
the five scores but weighting the decision domains based on principle components analysis (PCA). 
First I calculate the proportions of joint or independent decisions to total decisions by decision 
spheres and run PCA over the eight proportions. In all cases, I retain the first principal component 
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only because it captures the maximum variation present in the data (Filmer and Scott 2008; 
McKenzie 2005; Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006). The assumption underlying the use of the PCA 
first principal component as weights for the aggregation is that empowerment underlies the 
component of maximum variance in the data. In my case the first component explains 26% 
variation in baseline data and 30% variation in endline data. 
 
4.3.5. Econometric method 
I use difference-in-differences (DID) to estimate the impact of the livestock intervention on 
empowerment outcomes. Combined with household level fixed effect estimation, the DID 
approach corrects for endogeneity that may arise from unobserved individual effects (Bertrand et al. 
2004). As I have a panel of two ‘treatment’ groups (Original recipients and POG recipients) across 
two periods, the estimating equation includes multiple interactions of time and treatment. 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 +  𝛽1𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝐺 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + Π𝑋 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.1) 
  
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is outcome of interest for household i at time t. Time is a time dummy that equals one for 
endline and zero for baseline, Original is a treatment indicator that equals one for Original group and 
zero for others, POG equals one for POG group and zero for others, X is a vector of control 
variables that includes household size, number of children ages five years or below, number of 
children ages six to sixteen, age of the household head, level of education for the head, dummy 
variable for female head, and dummy variable for marital status of the household head, 𝑐𝑖 is the 
household level fixed effect, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is idiosyncratic error term. The coefficients of interest are β1 
and β2; β1 represents the program effect on the households experiencing full treatment and β2 
91 
 
represents the effect of training and spillover effects as well as the effect of delayed receipt of an 
animal. 
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Descriptive results 
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics and balancing tests for both control variables and 
outcome variables in the baseline. Overall, summary statistics and balancing test results indicate that 
my sample is reasonably balanced and the baseline characteristics are smoothly distributed across 
both the recipients and non-recipients. As in Chapter 3, I use the normalized differences (ND) for 
balancing test. The normalized difference is a difference between sample means of ‘treated’ and 
‘control’ groups weighted by the sum of sample variances. An absolute value of normalized 
differences greater than 0.25 may indicate violation of balancing assumption and suggests a potential 
to introduce bias in the regression (Imbens and Wooldridge 2008). Based on the normalized 
differences, household size and age of the household head for the ‘treated’ groups are significantly 
different from that of the ‘control’ group. All other observed characteristics of the ‘treated’ and 
‘control’ groups are equivalent. Even though household size and age of the household head are 
different for the ‘treated’ and ‘control’ groups, they are unlikely to contribute to selection bias as 
these variables do not change much over time so play only a small role in the fixed effects 
regression. Balancing tests on the outcome variables indicate that the various empowerment scores 
are similar across the ‘treated’ and ‘control’ groups in baseline. Moreover, the baseline results 
indicate a high prevalence of joint decision-making in all groups and similar scores for Male only and 
Female only decision-making. Given that both control and treated households applied to the 
program, their unobserved characteristics are also likely to be similar. I correct for any time invariant 
unobserved characteristics through the use of household fixed effects. 
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On average, households in the ‘treated’ groups have slightly larger household size than the 
‘control’ groups but the number of children under the age of five is the same across households in 
both groups; the difference in household size partly comes from the number of children ages six to 
sixteen. As a result, ‘treated’ households have slightly higher dependency ratios than control 
households. Across the sample, approximately 20% of households are headed by women and about 
80% of household heads are married. Household heads from the ‘treated’ groups are about seven 
years older than the heads from ‘control’ households (Table 4.2). The second half of Table 4.2 
presents women's and men's empowerment measures in baseline. Normalized differences for both 
men's and women's decision-making power (scores) show no difference in empowerment across 
treated and control groups in the baseline. Table C1 in Appendix C presents the mean number of 
decisions made in baseline and endline. On average, both ‘treated’ and ‘control’ households reported 
more decision-making activities in endline and the increase was greater among ‘treated’ households.19 
This suggests that the intervention can alter intra-household decision-making directly through 
activities related to transferred assets or indirectly through spillover to other decision spheres. 
Table 4.3 presents the distribution of intra-household decisions made by men and women 
members jointly or individually at baseline and endline by treatment group. Both women’s and 
men’s solitary decisions decrease after the intervention as the share of decisions in the household 
made together increases significantly. Households in the Original group had the biggest increase in 
joint decisions from 44% in baseline to 63% in endline followed by POG households, 56% to 65%. 
The share of joint decisions among control households barely increased and no increase was 
statistically significant. Table 4.4 presents decision scores that combine both joint and independent 
decisions together. Considering the scores that combine men’s independent and joint decisions, it is 
                                                          
19 The expansion in decision-making mostly came from ‘treatment’ related decision spheres such as animal 
slaughter and animal sale as well as activities related to access to loan/credit and crop produce sales which are 
not directly related to animal transfer but may have influence from associated training. 
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apparent that men’s involvement in decision-making increases in both treatment groups but has a 
statistically insignificant change in the control group. Likewise, women’s decision scores (including 
involvement in joint decisions) increase for original treated households, but have no significant 
change in other groups. Note that these decision scores combine both joint and individual decisions 
to calculate men's and women's decision-making power. As a result, the increase in decision score 
for both men and women is less than the increase in their decision scores presented in Table 4.3 
because any increase in joint decision-makings is tempered by decrease in individual decisions. 
Table 4.5 presents women’s decision scores over the eight decision spheres for Originals and 
Prospectives at baseline and endline. Similar statistics for men's decision scores are presented in 
Table 4.6. Over time, both women’s and men's participation in decision-making has increased in 
most decision spheres due to the growth in joint decision-making. After the intervention, male and 
female beneficiaries saw increased roles in most household decisions but the increase was statistically 
significant only in decision spheres related to transferred assets. For example, the Female and Joint 
decision scores for live animal sales rose from 0.66 in baseline to 0.89 in endline, suggesting that on 
average women are involved in all but a small share of decisions in the household related to live 
animal sales. The Male and Joint decision scores for live animal sales also increased from 0.65 in 
baseline to 0.74 in endline. Among other decisions, women had more say on sending kids to school 
and men gained involvement in loan/credit services. This observation is robust in that similar results 
hold for both joint and independent decision scores as well (Figure 4.3). In Figure 4.3, the change in 
the proportion of joint decisions between baseline and endline survey rounds is bigger for the 
Originals across all decision spheres except control over off-farm income. Consistent with 
observations in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, changes are larger for the decision spheres directly related to 
transferred assets. 
Table C2 in the Appendix C presents full results for both joint and women’s individual 
94 
 
decision ratios and the results are consistent across all five empowerment scores. Overall the 
descriptive results suggests that, when joint and solitary decisions are weighted equally in the 
empowerment score, the livestock and training intervention can expand women's decision-making 
abilities without shrinking men's role in household decision-making. This suggests that women's 
empowerment can be increased while increasing men’s engagement if the main source of growth in 
both men's and women's decision making scope is expansion in joint decisions. 
 
4.4.2. Empirical results and discussion 
I begin by using my data to explore the relationship between women’s empowerment and 
household wellbeing. I seek to confirm previous findings of the existence of positive correlations 
between women’s empowerment and economic development. Next, I use empowerment measures 
as outcome variables and assess the impact of the livestock intervention on women's and men’s 
decision-making power and on the role of joint decision-making. I estimate the impact on men’s 
decision-making power because I argue that assessing intra-household decision-making dynamics 
may be incomplete without analyzing changes for men. In contrast to the belief that intra-household 
decision-making is a zero-sum game, expansion in one’s decision-making abilities may not mean 
contraction in other’s decision-making abilities. If more decisions are being made jointly by men and 
women, it is possible that both men and women’s scope of decision-making can increase. Such an 
outcome might imply the benefits for women’s empowerment are achieved while maintaining male 
involvement. 
Table 4.7 presents the relationship between baseline women’s and men’s decision-making 
power and baseline poverty and food security outcomes. I run regressions of wellbeing outcomes on 
both decision scores and empowerment indexes. Results on the decision scores are positive but not 
statistically significant. Results based on empowerment indexes indicate that expansion in both joint 
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and women’s decision-making power positively corresponds to household consumption 
expenditures and dietary diversity, consistent with previous findings (Duflo 2012; Sharaunga et al. 
2015; Wilcox et al. 2015). Results for men’s empowerment index are not presented but expansion in 
men’s independent decision-making power has no correlation with consumption or dietary diversity. 
Table 4.8 presents the impact of the intervention on decision scores. The first two columns 
present the impact on women’s and men’s joint and independent decision-making power and 
columns (3), (4), and (5) present the impact on joint decisions, women’s independent decisions and 
men’s independent decisions. Results indicate that being an original recipient of the transfer and 
training resulted in a 9.3% increase in the Female and Joint decision score and a 7.6% increase in the 
Male and Joint decision score. Thus the program resulted in increased decision-making participation 
by men and women. Considering joint decisions and independent decisions  separately reveals that 
the intervention caused an expansion of joint decision-making by 17% and a 9% reduction in men’s 
independent decision making with no statistically significant impact on women’s independent 
decision making. Because the number of decision spheres does not change over time, expansion in 
joint decisions almost always comes from contraction in solitary decisions or addition of new joint 
decisions within existing decision spheres. 
In contrast to the original recipients, the POGs experience no statistically significant impacts 
from the treatment on the empowerment scores. The POG households received the same training 
but delayed and lower value asset transfers compared to the Originals. Thus, the lack of evidence of 
change in men’s and women’s decision-making among the POG households suggests a possible 
difference in the impact of training and education with and without asset transfers. Absent asset 
transfer, empowerment effects are not observed. The increase in women’s and men’s joint decision 
score with no change in their independent decision scores suggests that there has been a shift from 
independent to joint decision-making due to the intervention. 
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Results of the analysis using PCA to generate empowerment indexes rather than the scores 
are presented in Table 4.9. These results confirm the finding that receiving the initial asset transfer 
and training resulted in an increase in joint decisions and a decrease in decision’s made 
independently. The impression in this case is that there is an increase in the participation of women 
in decision-making, but no change in the participation of men in independent and joint decisions 
combined. When joint and independent decisions are considered separately, the intervention helped 
expand joint decision-making but at the expense of women’s and men’s independent decision 
making, consistent with my findings in case of decision scores. This implies that when joint and 
solitary decisions are combined, the decrease in solitary decisions may mask the expansion in joint 
decisions. Overall, results confirm that the intervention expanded joint decision-making. This 
finding is robust in that the results are consistent across the two different measures used in the 
analysis. 
To assess whether the impact on decision-making is restricted to decision spheres related to 
the asset transfer, I combine the eight decision spheres into a ‘treatment’ related sphere and a sphere 
for all other domains. The “treatment related” sphere includes decisions about cattle and goat sale, 
milk, meat, and draft power sale, cattle and goat slaughter, and women’s and men’s access to 
loan/credit. The “all other” sphere includes all remaining decisions across the eight decision spheres. 
Since I have only two decision spheres, my formula for decision score is not applicable in this case. 
So, I use the number of decisions as outcome of interest. Results based on women’s and men’s joint 
decisions are presented in Table 4.10 and results based on independent decisions are in Appendix C 
Table C3. When decision-making is measured for treatment-related activities only, both women and 
men who were original recipients saw expansion in their independent and joint decisions, but no 
evidence of significant effect on their independent decisions over treatment related activities. 
However, when decision-making is measures for `other activities’ not related to the intervention, the 
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intervention had no impact at all on joint and women’s decision-making but negative impact on 
men’s independent decision-making. Similar pattern holds for men and women in POG households. 
 
4.5. Discussion 
My empirical findings suggest that in agrarian settings transferring physical assets along with 
providing awareness training to both women and men can increase women's empowerment by 
expanding the scope of collective decision-making, and thus increases women’s influence in 
decisions while maintaining male participation. Motivated by this finding, I provide a potential 
theoretical explanation of the empirical results. Economic theory suggests several potential 
mechanisms for intra-household bargaining but Manser and Brown's (1980) threat point bargaining 
and Lundberg & Pollak's (1993) ‘separate spheres’ bargaining models are noteworthy for the case 
considered here. In their examination of a cash transfer program, Lundburg and Pollak argue that 
transferring cash to women as opposed to men may yield different results because household 
members have full control over the payoff of household resources under their control. The member 
who controls the majority of household resources may use non-cooperation, such as reduced work 
effort and refusal to share output, as a threat-point. This implies that transferring livestock to 
women could help increase women’s bargaining power in household activities, mainly among 
livestock related activities. This is consistent with my finding that the livestock intervention helps 
expand women's decision-making power. However, this model fails to explain why men's decision-
making power also improves simultaneously. What could explain this finding is Nash bargaining 
solution or altruism. 
The Nash bargaining solution to an intra-household bargaining model predicts that strategic 
non-cooperation by either player leads to Pareto inefficiency in household resource allocation and 
therefore household members are forced to negotiate or cooperate. In addition, altruism also may 
incentivize household members to come together and cooperate because altruism usually dominates 
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threat-point bargaining (Doss & Meinzen-Dick, 2015). Altruism and Nash bargaining solutions 
imply that even though women have the ownership of transferred animals, they may cooperate with 
their husbands or other adult males and share decision-making roles because non-cooperation leads 
to inefficiencies for the household. In Figure 4.4, I demonstrate how cooperation leads to Pareto 
efficiency in resource allocation. I start with the basic model from Manser and Brown (1980) and 
integrate the conceptual framework presented in (McElroy and Horney 1981; Basu 2006; 
Himmelweit et al. 2013; Lépine and Strobl 2013).  
Let us consider a household with two adults, one male (m) and one female (f). Let 𝑈𝑖 be a 
utility function of adult 𝑖 = 𝑚, 𝑓 defined over consumption vector (X) which includes private goods 
for adult i and shared goods for all household members. The utility function is strictly quasi-concave 
and monotone i.e. 𝑈𝑋
𝑖 > 0, 𝑈𝑋𝑋
𝑖 < 0 and each adult is endowed with a reserve utility 𝑉0
𝑖, the 
guaranteed minimum level of utility. Assuming the reserve utility depends not only on income (y) 
and market prices (p) but also on individual bargaining power (θ) i.e. 𝑉0
𝑖 = 𝑉0
𝑖(𝑝, 𝑦, 𝜃), the livestock 
intervention can impact intra-household-decision making through θ. Using the reserved utility pair 
as a threat point for cooperative bargaining process, the Nash solution for the bargaining problem is 
obtained by solving the following functional form 20  
 
 max
𝑥∈ℝ+
𝑁 = max[𝑈𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑉0
𝑓(𝑝, 𝑦, 𝜃)] . [𝑈𝑚(𝑥) − 𝑉0
𝑚(𝑝, 𝑦, 𝜃)]  subject to 
 𝑝𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 
 
(4.2) 
 
                                                          
20 Nash solution satisfies all key requirements of cooperative bargaining; both parties know each other’s 
preferences, the problem is symmetric, the outcome is invariant to linear transformation of utility functions, 
and independent of irrelevant alternatives 
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Given that the utility functions are strictly quasi-concave, solving equation (2) yields a unique 
solution. Figure 4.4 depicts the unique solution (N) in utility space where women’s utility is in y-axis 
and men’s utility is in x-axis. The locus of utility pairs results from Pareto optimal consumption 
bundles form the utility possibility frontier (UPF). If women and men do not cooperate, they are 
guaranteed their reserved utilities, 𝑉0
𝑓 and 𝑉0
𝑚, which also constitute a threat point,  𝑇 = (𝑉0
𝑓 , 𝑉0
𝑚). 
As neither player accepts anything below their threat point utility, if cooperation has to happen, the 
optimal solution must lie in the triangular region above TM* and to the right of TF*. Any payoff 
combination that lies below the utility possibility frontier is Pareto suboptimal and therefore the 
solution must lie in the arc between M* and F*. Although there can be multiple Pareto optimal 
solutions, the Nash solution assumes that men and women in the same household care about each 
other’s welfare and the altruistic behavior leads to the choice of a payoff combination that 
maximizes the product of their gains in utility over the threat point. The solution is unique because 
N is the only point in the Pareto efficient locus that maximizes the product of men’s and women's 
gains over threat point utilities. In essence, if men and women cooperate, women's empowerment 
can be improved without disempowering men. This model explains my empirical findings and also 
implies that the initial threat point utility of each adult dictates the final solution. If men have higher 
threat point utility to start with, the final solution may lie near M* and it will lie near F* if women 
have higher threat point utility. As policy interventions can change the initial threat point utility 
through θ, granting primary ownership of transferred animals to women may yield a final solution 
skewed to F* i.e. we can expect larger impact on women than on men. 
 
4.6. Conclusion  
This study assesses the impact of livestock transfers and training on the dynamics of intra-
household decision-making. Using data from a livestock allocation and training program in the 
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Copperbelt Province in Zambia, I investigate whether household decision making patterns are 
affected by the program and if expansion in women’s decision-making power within household can 
be reconciled with continued male engagement. Maintaining male participation may be important to 
completion of necessary activities that benefit from men’s labor and management. This study is 
among the first to test for effects of a program targeting women on both men’s and women’s 
decision-making influence. In addition to testing for the effects of the intervention on decision-
making spheres directly impacted by the project such as livestock related activities, I also test for 
spillovers into other household activities including child education and crop sales. Results show that 
transferring physical assets along with providing awareness training to both women and men of 
recipient households helps expand cooperation in intra-household decision-making. The results 
results also reveal that women's empowerment can be improved without compromising men's 
engagement because the intervention promotes cooperation between the two and expands joint 
decisions. The improvement in joint decision-making accompanied by reduction in individual 
decision-making implies that women and men in the beneficiary households may have shifted from 
independent decision-making to joint decision-making after the intervention. However, since the 
proportion of households making any decisions has also increased over time significantly, the 
expansion could also come from addition of new decisions due to asset transfers and training. Due 
to the lack of appropriate data, this analysis is unable to detect exact contribution of the shift from 
independent to joint decision-making and that of addition of new joint decisions on expansion in 
joint-decision-making. 
Further examination shows expansion in men's and women’s decision-making participation 
largely comes from increased roles in activities directly related to the transferred assets. In particular, 
the intervention helped increase the proportion of joint decisions by 17% in all household activities 
considered and both men’s and women’s independent decisions regarding all 8 decision spheres 
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decreased by as much as 9%. When household activities were categorized to ‘treatment related’ and 
‘other’ activities, women’s and men’s joint decisions increased at the expense of their independent 
decision-making participation. The intervention also contributed to increases in joint decisions 
among POG households, but the impact was limited to the decision spheres related to the 
transferred assets only. When solitary and joint decisions are combined together to measure 
decision-making power, the positive impact of the intervention subsided probably because the 
expansion in joint decisions is offset by a reduction in individual decisions. This finding highlights a 
critical methodological point: the importance of considering joint and solitary decisions separately 
because combining them obscures intra-household dynamics, in particular, the fact that expansion in 
joint decisions is probably masked by the reduction in solitary decisions. Failure to attend to this 
point will likely underestimate of the true impacts of interventions on decision-making and 
empowerment. 
In general, the larger impact on the Original recipient households and minimal or no effect 
on the POG households who received lower value assets after a delay, implies that programs that 
provide awareness or educational training on gender balance, social justice, and other themes related 
to day-to-day household activities may be more effective when combined with physical asset 
transfers. The observed large increase in joint decisions accompanied by a decrease in the 
proportion of solitary decisions indicates that the intervention helped move households toward 
gender equity and shared responsibilities in activities on the extensive margin. Impacts on decision 
making in established areas were less pronounced even in the presence of asset transfer. This result 
suggests that changes in decision-making power are more likely to emerge in the presence of 
economic transformations that introduce new decisions to the household. 
My analysis reveals that empowerment is not a zero-sum game in agrarian settings where 
household decisions are often made independently by men or women and involve a relatively 
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narrow range of activities. The introduction of new management opportunities with new decisions 
can create space for more joint decision-making, expanding women’s overall engagement without 
diminishing men’s involvement. Incorporating men in women's empowerment programs may also 
incentivize cooperation between the two. Therefore, interventions that aim to improve women's 
empowerment may enhance effectiveness by integrating men in program design. One way to do so 
could be transferring economic resources to the family through women but providing associated 
training to both men and women simultaneously so that men are willing to share decision-making 
responsibilities in household activities. 
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4.7. Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Selection procedure and treatment groups 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Timeline of survey and corresponding sample size 
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Figure 4.3. Change in the joint decision scores over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Nash solution for a cooperative bargaining model 
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Table 4.1: Survey characteristics and attrition 
Treatment Status Baseline Endline Attrition (%) Attrition 
     
Originals 104 100 3.8 -4 
     
POGs 105 96 8.6 -9 
     
Prospectives 67 64 4.5 -3 
     
Total 276 260 5.8 -16 
Notes: Baseline is the first follow up survey from a larger field experiment I conducted in the 
Copperbelt Province. See Kafle et al. (2016) and Jodlowski et al. (2016) for details about the 
experiment and other survey rounds. Independents are excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics and balancing tests on baseline sample 
 Treatment Status Normalized Difference 
Variables  Original POG Prospective ND1 ND2 
Household Size 7.24  
(0.266) 
7.10  
(0.296) 
5.84  
(0.292) 
0.36 0.32 
 
 
No. of children 5 or under 1.19  
(0.101) 
1.22  
(0.099) 
1.00  
(0.134) 
0.13 
 
0.15 
 
 
No. of children 6 to 16 2.28  
(0.168) 
2.52   
(0.183) 
1.84  
(0.198) 
0.18 0.27 
 
 
Female head (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.21  
(0.041) 
0.15  
(0.036) 
0.19  
(0.049) 
0.04 -0.08 
 
 
Married head (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.82  
(0.038) 
0.89  
(0.033) 
0.78  
(0.052) 
0.07 0.19 
 
 
Education of head 2.90  
(0.142) 
3.10  
(0.158) 
2.94  
(0.165) 
-0.02 0.08 
 
 
Age of head 51.1  
(1.300) 
44.6  
(1.404) 
43.7  
(1.800) 
0.35 0.04 
 
 
Female and joint decision score 0.74  
(0.030) 
0.80  
(0.026) 
0.79  
(0.036) 
-0.12 0.02 
 
 
Male and joint decision score 0.70  
(0.034) 
0.77  
(0.032) 
0.78  
(0.041) 
-0.16 -0.03 
 
 
Female only decision score 0.30  
(0.034) 
0.23  
(0.032) 
0.22  
(0.041) 
-0.25 -0.01 
 
 
Male only decision score 0.26  
(0.030) 
0.20  
(0.027) 
0.21  
(0.036) 
0.16 0.02 
 
 
Joint decision score 0.44  
(0.035) 
0.56  
(0.036) 
0.57  
(0.045) 
0.12 -0.01 
Observations 100 96 64   
Notes: Point estimates are mean and standard errors are in parentheses.  
ND1 and ND2 indicate the value of normalized difference between Originals and Prospectives, and 
POGs and Prospectives, respectively. 
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Table 4.3: Distribution of decision scores by treatment groups over time 
 Joint Female only Male only 
 Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Baseline Endline 
Original 0.44 0.63*** 0.30 0.19** 0.26 0.18** 
 (0.035) (0.041) (0.034) (0.026) (0.030) (0.021) 
       
POG 0.56 0.65* 0.23 0.16 0.20 0.18 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.032) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021) 
       
Prospective 0.57 0.59 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.23 
 (0.045) (0.046) 
 
(0.041) (0.028) (0.036) (0.027) 
Full sample 0.52 0.63*** 0.26 0.18*** 0.22 0.19 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.020) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) 
Observations 260 259 260 259 260 259 
Notes: Point estimates are mean. Standard errors are in parentheses, asterisks indicate the level of 
significance for test of equality of means over time, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.  
Decision scores are the weighted scores of joint or independent decisions made by women, men, or 
jointly. Joint and independent decisions are equally weighted. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4: Distribution of decision scores by treatment groups over time 
 
Treatment status 
Female & Joint* Male & Joint 
Baseline Endline Baseline Endline 
Original 0.74 0.81** 0.70 0.80** 
 (0.030) (0.019) (0.034) (0.026) 
     
POG 0.80 0.83 0.77 0.83* 
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.032) (0.022) 
     
Prospective 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.81 
 (0.036) (0.027) (0.041) (0.028) 
     
Full sample 0.77 0.81* 0.74 0.81*** 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.020) (0.015) 
Observations 260 259 260 259 
Notes: Point estimates are mean. Standard errors are in parentheses, asterisks indicate the level of 
significance for test of equality of means over time, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
*Women’s (men’s) score is the weighted score of women’s (men’s) joint or independent 
participation in intra-household decision-making. Joint and independent decisions are equally 
weighted. 
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Table 4.5: Women’s independent and joint decision scores by individual decision spheres 
Decision spheres  Originals Prospectives 
Baseline Endline Baseline Endline 
Sending kids to school 0.78 0.92*** 0.88 0.89 
 (0.042) (0.028) (0.042) (0.040) 
 
Animal slaughter 0.76 0.90** 0.83 0.79 
 (0.048) (0.028) (0.056) (0.051) 
 
Live animal sale 0.66 0.89*** 0.79 0.79 
 (0.081) (0.028) (0.114) (0.051) 
 
Animal product sale 0.73 0.77 0.50 0.86 
 (0.082) (0.072) (0.50) (0.143) 
 
Crop produce sale 0.76 0.72 0.86 0.78 
 (0.047) (0.041) (0.054) (0.045) 
 
Off-farm income 0.61 0.55 0.52 0.51 
 (0.090) (0.071) (0.102) (0.077) 
 
Access to loan/credit 0.75 0.76 0.80 0.80 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.052) (0.049) 
 
Crop storage/sale 0.68 0.50 0.60 0.73 
 (0.102) (0.167) (0.163) (0.141) 
Observations 100 100 64 64 
Notes: Point estimates are mean decision scores for women’s independent and joint decisions. 
Standard errors are in parentheses, asterisks indicate the level of significance for test of equality of 
means over time, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
All decision spheres, except sending kids to school, involve multiple decisions and the women’s 
empowerment score is the weighted score of women’s independent and joint decisions made in the 
household 
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Table 4.6: Men’s independent and joint decision scores by individual decision spheres 
Decision spheres  Originals Prospectives 
Baseline Endline Baseline Endline 
Sending kids to school 0.86  0.78  0.88  0.89  
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) 
     
Animal slaughter 0.50  0.73***  0.61  0.72  
 (0.057) (0.043) (0.075) (0.058) 
     
Live animal sale 0.65  0.74***  0.57  0.73  
 (0.083) (0.043) (0.137) (0.057) 
     
Animal product sale 0.70  0.86  0.50  0.71  
 (0.085) (0.060) (0.50) (0.184) 
     
Crop produce sale 0.66  0.94  0.77  0.89  
 (0.052) (0.021) (0.067) (0.037) 
     
Off-farm income 0.65  0.67  0.74  0.73  
 (0.088) (0.067) (0.094) (0.068) 
     
Access to loan/credit 0.75  0.94***  0.84  0.90  
 (0.046) (0.026) (0.047) (0.038) 
     
Crop storage/sale 0.57  0.50  0.60  0.55  
 (0.106) (0.167) (0.163) (0.157) 
Observations 100 100 64 64 
Notes: Point estimates are mean decision scores for men's independent and joint decisions. Standard 
errors are in parentheses, asterisks indicate the level of significance for test of equality of means over 
time, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.  
All decision spheres, except sending kids to school, involve multiple decisions and the men’s 
empowerment score is the ratio of number of men's solitary and joint decisions to number of total 
decision made in the household 
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Table 4.7: Relationship between empowerment measures and household wellbeing: expenditures and 
dietary diversity (DDS)† 
 Total 
Exp. 
Food 
Exp. 
DDS Total 
Exp. 
Food 
Exp. 
DDS 
Joint empowerment index 0.051* 0.049* 0.22** - - - 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.10)    
       
Women’s empowerment index - - - 0.054* 0.066** 0.080 
    (0.029) (0.029) (0.096) 
       
Household Size -0.070*** -0.092*** 0.091 -0.074*** -0.097*** 0.081 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.092) (0.022) (0.022) (0.093) 
       
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 259 259 259 259 259 259 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, level of significance * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.  
Both joint and women’s empowerment indexes are calculated by running the principal component 
analysis method on joint and women’s independent decision scores for 8 decision spheres.  
Total and food expenditure are in Kwacha per capita per week. Household dietary diversity is 
calculated using USDA FANTA’s approach, includes 13 food groups.  
‡Other controls include number of children ages 5 or under, aged 6 to 16, indicators for female head 
and married head, and age and education of head 
†Results are obtained from simple OLS regression on baseline data. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8: Project impact on women and men’s decision-making power based on decision scores 
 Decision scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Female & Joint Male & Joint Joint Female only Male only 
Endline -0.033 0.037 0.003 -0.036 0.034 
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.049) (0.035) (0.038) 
      
Original x Endline 0.093* 0.076* 0.17*** -0.073 -0.090* 
 (0.050) (0.046) (0.058) (0.046) (0.050) 
      
POG x Endline 0.058 0.029 0.085 -0.027 -0.056 
 (0.049) (0.045) (0.062) (0.044) (0.049) 
      
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 517 517 517 517 517 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance level, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Household controls include household size, number of children ages 5 or under, number of children 
ages 6 to 16, indicators for female head and married head, and level and squared of age and 
education of head 
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Table 4.9: Project impact on women and men’s decision-making power based on decision index 
 Decision index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Female & Joint Male & Joint Joint Female only Male only 
Endline -0.39 -0.066 -0.43* 0.18 0.49** 
 (0.24) (0.19) (0.23) (0.17) (0.20) 
      
Original x Endline 0.54* -0.053 0.56* -0.27 -0.99*** 
 (0.29) (0.24) (0.30) (0.24) (0.27) 
      
POG x Endline 0.32 -0.006 0.40 -0.16 -0.40 
 (0.28) (0.23) (0.29) (0.22) (0.26) 
      
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 518 518 518 518 518 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance level, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Household controls include household size, number of children ages 5 or under, number of children 
ages 6 to 16, indicators for female head and married head, and level and squared of age and 
education of head 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.10: Project impact on women and men’s decision-making power based on treatment related 
and other activities 
 Treatment related domains Other domains 
 Female & Joint Male & Joint Female & Joint Male & Joint 
Endline 1.04*** 0.95*** 2.46*** 2.11*** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.39) (0.37) 
     
Original x Endline 0.93*** 0.67*** 0.67 0.28 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.53) (0.52) 
     
POG x Endline 0.49* 0.92*** 0.42 0.018 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.50) (0.46) 
     
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 518 518 518 518 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance level, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Household controls include household size, number of children ages 5 or under, number of children 
ages 6 to 16, indicators for female head and married head, and level and squared of age and 
education of head 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
Policies aiming to improve individual and household wellbeing often transfer economic 
resources to families in need, especially in developing countries. Examples include conditional or 
unconditional cash transfers, physical asset transfers, or micro-credit, but there is no gold standard 
for what economic resources to transfer for the best results. One strand of development literature 
argues for superiority of cash transfers over physical asset transfers (Blattman and Niehaus 2014) 
but, more recently a large body of evidence points to a wide range of positive impacts of physical 
asset transfers (Banerjee et al. 2015; Jodlowski et al. 2016; Das et al. 2013; Muralidharan and Prakash 
2013; Rawlins et al. 2014). Unlike cash, assets are multidimensional and the effects of assets may 
vary with the types of assets. 
In this dissertation, I demonstrate that, in contrast to the traditional view of assets having 
positive effects as wealth, different types of assets have differential effects. Specifically, I find child 
education being negatively affected by agricultural assets but non-agricultural assets have expected 
positive effects. Then, using data from a livestock transfers intervention in Zambia, I examine the 
practical significance of the impact of exogenous increase in physical assets (livestock) on dietary 
quality, consumption pattern, and women’s empowerment and intra-household decision-making. 
After confirming the previous findings that transferring livestock to impoverished families has a 
relatively small absolute impact on consumption expenditure, I show that, though small in 
magnitude, the positive impact is persistent and transformative. Livestock recipients diversified their 
diets with more nutritious foods and had an enhanced feeling of economic wellbeing. It also helped 
improve the local food economy as more varieties of food items are being consumed and local 
prices of animal source foods is decreasing in recipient villages. Men and women from the recipient 
households also received training on gender balance, entrepreneurship, animal management, 
nutrition, and other themes related to day-day activities and further examination reveals that the 
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intervention altered the dynamics of intra-household decision-making. Men and women receiving 
both livestock and training have moved from solitary decision-making to joint decision-making in 
most household activities.  
Taken together, as the effects of physical asset accumulation differ with the types of assets, 
the traditional undifferentiated view of assets as wealth indicator may need a careful review. In 
addition, policies transferring specific assets or contributing to asset accumulation may need to use 
caution as to what specific resources to transfer and the potential negative effects of transferred 
assets in long-run economic development. Even though transferring physical assets may help reduce 
poverty, and improve food security in short run by providing additional source of income and 
nutritious foods, it may hurt economic development in long run by discouraging investment in 
childhood development and children’s education. Since assets that may hurt childhood development 
may also contribute to poverty reduction, and food and nutrition security, asset transfer programs 
contingent on children’s schooling or ‘no child labor’ policies may help improve both short- and 
long-run economic development goals. However, my finding of coordinated asset transfers 
contributing to women’s empowerment through expansion of joint decisions in intra-household 
decision-making implies that efforts to promote gender equity and women’s empowerment may 
benefit by incorporating asset transfers and awareness training together. One explanation for this is 
that transferring assets does increase recipient’s bargaining position which, as the Nash bargaining 
model predicts, eventually should lead to cooperation between household members for Pareto 
optimal resource allocation.  
Studies in this dissertation have some limitations as well as scope for improvement. One 
limitation of my findings is that the differential effects of different types of assets may hold only for 
people in certain economic class. As income grows child labor demand becomes more inelastic to 
the opportunity cost of schooling or market wage and the negative effects of agricultural assets may 
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be more than offset by positive wealth effects. Transferring physical assets to the ultra-poor may be 
counter-effective because the recipients may be unable to afford the maintenance cost of the 
transferred assets. For this reason, the intervention in Zambia excludes ultra-poor households and 
the results from the third and fourth chapters may not hold for households trapped in persistent 
poverty.  
This dissertation may be improved in multiple ways. One could expand the second chapter 
by further exploring negative effects of agricultural assets on child education. Designing a 
randomized control trial to assess the impact of transferring agricultural assets on child education 
outcomes may be a path forward. Because the asset indices are hard to interpret, considering an 
alternative approach for the principal component method for constructing asset variables may be 
worth pursuing. Chapter 4 can be improved with detailed data on men’s and women’s 
empowerment variables such as decision-making dynamics on consumption activities, access and 
control over income, land and home ownerships, household assets etc. This study would provide 
further insights if one could identify the effects of asset transfers and training separately. Several 
questions on comparison of cash versus asset transfers still remain unanswered and there is a scope 
to design an experiment to directly compare cash and asset transfers intervention by transferring 
equal value of assets and cash to households of similar economic status.
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APPENDIX A 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
Table A1. Pooled scoring factors and baseline summary statistics of asset variable 
Household 
durables 
Mean 
Scoring 
factors 
Agricultural assets  Mean 
Scoring 
factors 
Housing quality characteristics  Mean 
Scoring 
factors 
Radios 0.79 0.15  Hoes 2.27 0.03 Own dwelling (1=Yes 0=No) 0.78 -0.26 
TVs 0.24 0.36  Spraying machines 0.04 0.10 Rent dwelling (1=Yes 0=No) 0.14 0.26 
Telephones 0.02 0.12  Water pumps 0.02 0.13 House wall (1=cement/concrete, 0=else) 0.28 0.34 
Mobile phone 1.11 0.30  Reapers 0.00 0.31 House roof (1=metal sheets 0=else) 0.66 0.25 
Refrigerators 0.14 0.33  Tractors 0.00 0.31 House floor (1=concrete/cement/tiles 0=else) 0.43 0.36 
Sewing 
machines 
0.13 0.19  Trailers 0.00 0.31 Number of rooms (=1 if 3 or more 0=else) 0.55 0.01 
Video/DVDs 0.19 0.26  Ploughs 0.07 0.08 Safe water (1=boiled/bottled/treated 0=else) 0.33 0.17 
Computers 0.07 0.05  Harrows 0.00 0.31 Water source (1=protected, 0=open source) 0.53 0.24 
Irons 0.36 0.29  Milking machines 0.00 0.40 Water hauling time(1=less than average, 0 else) 0.62 0.00 
Electric/gas 
stoves 
0.08 0.26 
 
Harvesters/threshers 
0.00 0.40 Access to toilet (1=Yes 0=No) 0.90 0.04 
Other Stoves 0.69 0.24  Hand miller 0.01 0.22 Toilet type (1=modern, 0=Vault/Pit) 0.13 0.26 
Water heaters 0.04 0.23  Coffee pulper 0.00 0.25 Electricity (1=Yes 0=No) 0.23 0.37 
Cassette 
players 
0.02 0.07  Fertilizer distributors 0.00 0.38 Fuel(1=electricity/gas/generator/solar,0=else) 0.24 0.37 
Music systems 0.03 0.12  Livestock 3.84 0.03 Cooking fuel (1=firewood 0=else) 0.71 -0.36 
Cars 0.05 0.23  Poultries 5.81 0.01    
Motor cycles 0.05 0.14  Donkeys 0.06 0.04    
Carts 0.54 0.05  Plots 1.61 0.02    
Bicycles 0.02 0.09  Outboard engines 0.03 0.03    
Wheel barrows 0.03 0.07 
Land owned (1=Yes, 
0=No) 
0.64 0.01    
Boats/canoes 0.01 0.02 Land rented (1=Yes) 0.06 0.00    
Houses 1.17 -0.03 Land shared (1=Yes) 0.01 0.00    
Fan/ACs 0.23 0.30  0.13 0.00    
Dish antennas 0.13 0.26       
Observations  3082 3082  3082 3082  3082 3082 
Notes. All asset variables are in count, unless otherwise indicated. Asset indexes calculated by using binary indicators of asset ownership are 
not qualitatively different from the indexes resulting from count variables. Scoring factor is the weight that is used to calculate the first 
principal component. The first component explains 26 percent of the variance in durable assets 
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Table A2. Likelihood of child labor on own-farm agricultural activities 
 Model: Pooled Probit 
 Rural Urban Crop 
producers 
Livestock 
keepers 
Log(Total expenditure) 0.165*** 0.053 0.123*** 0.143*** 
 (0.033) (0.064) (0.031) (0.034) 
     
Household durable index -0.014 -0.011 -0.004 -0.025 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.017) 
     
Agricultural asset index 0.016** -0.005 0.011* 0.008 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
     
Housing quality index -0.222*** -0.192*** -0.168*** -0.133*** 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.017) (0.018) 
     
School in village (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.807*** 0.404*** 0.693*** 0.549*** 
 (0.117) (0.105) (0.090) (0.105) 
     
Max. parent's education -0.112*** -0.030 -0.100*** -0.079*** 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.018) (0.018) 
     
Gender (1=Male, 0=Female) 0.154*** 0.218*** 0.169*** 0.152*** 
 (0.035) (0.069) (0.033) (0.035) 
     
Head’s gender (1=Male, 0=Female) 0.005 -0.120 -0.065 -0.062 
 (0.060) (0.133) (0.060) (0.063) 
     
Age (years) 0.094*** 0.049*** 0.093*** 0.096*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Age started school -0.022 -0.045 -0.019 -0.015 
 (0.013) (0.029) (0.013) (0.014) 
     
Household size -0.058*** -0.111*** -0.063*** -0.069*** 
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations 8097 3897 8798 7219 
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
Dependent variable is child labor in agriculture (1= yes, 0 = no) and the results are obtained from 
pooled probit model. 
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Table A3. Effect of asset ownership on primary school leaving exam performance 
 Dep. variable: PSLE pass ratio 
 RE FE HTIV 
Log(Total expenditure) 0.056*** 0.036*** 0.041*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
    
Asset index 0.019*** 0.011** 0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
    
School in village 0.008 0.013 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
    
Max parent's education  0.006 - 0.063*** 
 (0.005)  (0.019) 
    
Head: age 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Head: Gender (1=male, 0=female) -0.032** -0.072*** -0.030** 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.014) 
    
Household size -0.023*** 0.002 -0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Observations 6029 6029 6029 
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. As the 
dependent variable is at the household level, no individual characteristics are included in the model. 
Results are presented for key variables only, estimated model includes more variables. 
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Table A4. Effect of asset ownership on Form IV Exam (FIVE) performance 
 Dep. variable: FIVE pass ratio 
 RE FE HTIV 
Log(Total expenditure) 0.042*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
    
Asset index 0.025*** 0.008* 0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
    
School in village 0.010 0.007 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) 
    
Max parent's education 0.011*** - 0.078*** 
 (0.004)  (0.018) 
    
Head: age 0.002*** 0.001 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Head: Gender (1=male, 0=female) -0.022* -0.032 -0.014 
 (0.013) (0.035) (0.013) 
    
Household size -0.009*** 0.000 -0.005** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 5219 5219 5219 
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. As the 
dependent variable is at the household level, no individual characteristics are included in the model. 
Results are presented for key variables only, estimated model includes more variables. 
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APPENDIX B 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
Table B1: Impact on food expenditures over time 
  Expenditures     
 Rice Meat Milk Oil Sugar/beverage Maize 
Original2 0.785 0.459 0.941 0.467 0.225 0.331 
 (0.734) (0.591) (0.677) (0.343) (0.272) (0.262) 
       
Original3 1.169* 0.798 3.136*** 0.328 0.529** -0.053 
 (0.681) (0.491) (0.688) (0.313) (0.253) (0.303) 
       
Original4 1.635** 0.786 1.866*** 0.246 0.452 0.937** 
 (0.728) (0.537) (0.712) (0.387) (0.328) (0.401) 
       
POG2 0.211 0.455 0.314 0.343 -0.374 0.382 
 (0.754) (0.649) (0.620) (0.350) (0.268) (0.304) 
       
POG3 -0.091 1.045* 1.349** 0.0226 0.108 0.502** 
 (0.730) (0.559) (0.638) (0.289) (0.233) (0.255) 
       
POG4 1.400* 1.119** 1.803*** 0.524 0.196 1.076** 
 (0.766) (0.528) (0.689) (0.323) (0.310) (0.417) 
Observations 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, Level of significance: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Dependent variables are log of expenditures and livestock revenue. Both expenditures and revenue are in 
Kwacha per-capita per week. The full specification of the estimated model is: ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +
 ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑡𝑃𝑂𝐺𝑖𝑡 + Π𝑋 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
4
𝑡=2
4
𝑡=2
4
𝑡=2  where X= (dummy variables for 
female head, marital status, positive shock, negative shock) 
Originali, and POGi are 'treatment' dummies for i=2,3,4. For example, Original2 equals 1 for all Originals in 
the second survey round, and Orignal4 equals 1 for all Originals in the final round and 0 otherwise. 
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Table B2: Impact on poverty and food security measures 
 Feeling poor Food secure 
Dairy Cow -1.360*** 0.594*** 
 (0.270) (0.169) 
   
Meat Goats -0.339** 0.0677 
 (0.155) (0.149) 
   
Draft Cattle -0.694*** 0.181 
 (0.239) (0.196) 
   
POG 0.153 -0.0868 
 (0.129) (0.127) 
   
Independent 0.425** -0.283 
 (0.167) (0.176) 
Observations 1200 1200 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, Level of significance: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Both dependent variables are binary. Feeling poor equals 1 if people are feeling relatively worse and 0 if 
feeling same or better. Food secure equals 1 if people feel food secured and 0 if they feel otherwise. Results 
are obtained from the pooled probit regression. 
 
 
 
 
Figure B1: Impact of livestock transfers on dairy/meat consumption frequency 
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APPENDIX C 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Table C1. Mean number of decisions made in baseline and endline 
  Full sample Original Prospectives 
Decision domains Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Baseline Endline 
Sending kids to school  1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 
 
(0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)  
       
Animal slaughter 0.80 2.23 0.88 2.49 0.73 1.78 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.14) 
       
Live animal sale 0.28 2.23 0.38 2.48 0.25 1.78 
 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.14) 
       
Animal product sale 0.13 0.27 0.30 0.36 0.03 0.14 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
       
Crop produce sale 1.11 2.19 1.23 2.37 0.88 2.11 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
       
Off-farm income 0.40 0.55 0.30 0.51 0.41 0.70 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
       
Access to loan/credit 1.23 1.41 1.30 1.53 1.20 1.19 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
       
Crop storage/sale 0.23 0.12 0.24 0.10 0.16 0.17 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Observations 260 260 100 100 64 64 
Notes: Point estimates are mean number of decisions made. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
If no decisions are made, then number of decisions made is recorded as zero.
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Table C2. Distribution of decision ratios by decision domains over time 
 Originals  Prospectives 
Decision domains  Female only decisions Joint decisions Female only decisions Joint decisions 
Baseline  Endline  Baseline  Endline  Baseline  Endline  Baseline  Endline  
Sending kids to school 0.14 0.22 0.64 0.69 0.13 0.11 0.75 0.77 
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.048) (0.046) (0.042) (0.039) (0.055) (0.053) 
 
Animal slaughter 0.36 0.27*** 0.18 0.62*** 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.46 
 (0.047) (0.043) (0.039) (0.046) (0.055) (0.053) (0.057) (0.061) 
 
Live animal sale 0.12 0.26 0.11 0.63*** 0.09 0.24 0.08 0.47 
 (0.033) (0.042) (0.030) (0.045) (0.037) (0.052) (0.034) (0.061) 
 
Animal product sale 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.22 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.06** 
 (0.029) (0.022) (0.034) (0.042) (0.016) (0.022) (0.000) (0.030) 
 
Crop produce sale 0.23 0.06*** 0.33 0.63*** 0.14 0.11 0.37 0.65 
 (0.040) (0.020) (0.046) (0.045) (0.041) (0.036) (0.060) (0.055) 
 
Off-farm income 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.16 
 (0.028) (0.034) (0.026) (0.029) (0.037) (0.046) (0.035) (0.046) 
 
Access to loan/credit 0.21 0.06*** 0.42 0.64*** 0.13 0.09 0.54 0.63 
 (0.039) (0.024) (0.048) (0.047) (0.041) (0.035) (0.061) (0.059) 
 
Crop storage/sale 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.00** 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.05 
 (0.029) (0.022) (0.022) (0.000) (0.030) (0.034) (0.022) (0.027) 
Observations 100 100 100 100 64 64 64 64 
Notes: Point estimates are mean and standard errors are in parentheses, asterisks indicate the level of significance for test of equality of 
means over time, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Male only decisions are not presented but they follow the similar pattern observed in case 
of female only decisions 
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Table C3: Project impact on women and men’s decision-making power based on treatment related 
and other activities 
 Treatment related domains Other domains 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Joint Female only Male only Joint Female only Male only 
Endline 0.74*** 0.30** 0.20** 1.76*** 0.70*** 0.35* 
 (0.21) (0.12) (0.092) (0.42) (0.22) (0.19) 
       
Original x Endline 0.75*** 0.18 -0.083 0.80 -0.13 -0.52** 
 (0.24) (0.16) (0.14) (0.57) (0.33) (0.25) 
       
POG x Endline 0.70*** -0.22 0.22 0.52 -0.096 -0.50* 
 (0.27) (0.15) (0.14) (0.53) (0.30) (0.27) 
       
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 518 518 518 518 518 518 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance level, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Household controls include household size, number of children ages 5 or under, number of children 
ages 6 to 16, indicators for female head and married head, and level and squared of age and 
education of head 
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